Abstract

The lasting impact of pre-adult experiences has been shown to affect a number of long-term political orientations, such as partisanship, issue opinions, and trust in government. In this project, I examine the effects of pre-adult experiences on perceptions of social groups, the persistence of those orientations over time, and the extent to which said orientations influence public opinion. Building from previous literature demonstrating the powerful effects group sentiment has on public opinion, this project seeks to determine the extent these orientations are developed in early adulthood, as opposed to over time. I test this expectation using the waves of the Political Socialization Study, examining the over-time relationship between youth perceptions of social groups, parental perceptions of groups, and opinion on issues arguably connected to those groups.
Political Socialization and Group-Centrism

Democratic politics is built upon the interplay between citizens and government. While government carries the burden of deciding how to best achieve the desired ends for society, it must receive a mandate from its citizens in order to act, and ultimately, to achieve those ends. The voices of the citizenry must unite to express preferences for the proper ends for society, and the means with which those ends are to be achieved. Underwriting the relationship between citizen and government is public opinion. For good or for ill, citizen opinion is meant to serve as the rudder which steers the ship that is government. To understand democratic politics, one must begin by considering the ways in which opinions are formed and expressed.

As a result, scholarship in public opinion has spent considerable effort in an attempt to understand these factors, revealing a veritable ‘menu of choice’ of possible considerations which citizens might make use of. These considerations range from the concrete possession of factual political knowledge about a judgment at hand, to the broadly abstract, such as values, or ideology. The considerations citizens make use of has been shown to be a function of a number of factors, including their attention to politics and innate cognitive ability (Brewer 2003; Jacoby 2006; Kam 2005). Of the plethora of considerations available to citizens, one which has been shown to be pervasive across all citizens is the heuristic of group sentiment.

While past research has demonstrated that, under particular circumstances, citizens are more likely to make use of group sentiments in forming opinions, particularly when they observe a clear tie between group and outcome, little is known as to why citizens would rely on group sentiments rather than some other heuristic. This project considers whether this tendency may be learned through the process of being socialized to politics. Using data from the Youth-Parent Political Socialization study, I find that children who come of age in households where the
parents hold strong group views are likely to rely on those same views when forming opinions in adulthood both in early adulthood and later in life.

**Starting from Scratch**

As citizens, we all begin our lives as blank slates, to be informed about the ways of the world through our experiences. Political socialization is the process through which youth learn about politics, which is thought to lead to the formation of adult opinions and shape adult political behavior (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Beck and Jennings 1982; Jennings and Markus 1984). While politics itself may appear highly complex at any given point in the life-cycle, most citizens have basic orientations which allow them to at least scratch the surface of the political realm; many of these orientations are acquired early in life (Jennings 1990; Sears 1983), some as early as childhood (German 2005).

This socialization to politics has been shown generally to occur through multiple sources which comprise the context in which children are raised. These include children’s schools and relationships with teachers, their social networks, and their political and social environment (Hughes et al. 2006; Spencer 1983; Thorton et al. 1990). However, while each of these has demonstrable effects on adult political characteristics, the principal agent of socialization is thought to be the family (Jennings and Niemi 1974).

A good deal of scholarship has been dedicated to understanding just how the views of the family come to shape the subsequent beliefs of adult offspring. The transmission model suggests that children directly inherit their adult political beliefs from their parents (Beck and Jennings 1991; Dalton 1982; Jennings 1984); while this seems to hold for certain beliefs, such as partisan identity, the modest similarities across the domain of adult attitudes between parents and children
suggest that the direct transmission of attitudes across generations may be the exception rather than the rule (but see Dalton (1980) for evidence in support of the direct transmission of beliefs).

Instead of a direct path, it may be that the formation of an adult political identity occurs indirectly, as familial influences shape children’s social identity, which in turn influences their political orientation (Glass, Bengtson, and Dunham 1986; Sigel and Hoskin 1981; Soloman and Steinitz 1979). In a similar vein, socialization could be considered a two-stage process in which youth perceptions of parental values develop, and, subsequently, youth develop their own views (as well as adapting existing ones) in line with those same perceptions (Westholm 1999).

Learned Biases?

There may remain some uncertainty as to how views are transmitted from parents to children; there is also considerable evidence that parents’ views are passed along to their children. While the effects of political socialization are somewhat limited when considering political orientations generally, among the beliefs familial socialization has been shown to shape, group considerations seem to be among the most transmittable. The inherent human tendency to sort the world into social categories produces in-groups and out-groups; those who hold negative attitudes toward out-groups are thought to have developed those sentiments through socialization (Guimond 2000; Guimond, Begin, and Palmer 1989; Guimond and Palmer 1990). Allport, in his famous study of prejudice (Allport 1954) argued that children’s’ racial attitudes were acquired directly from their parents who are responsible for painting children’s pictures of race and ethnicity (Hughes 2003).

The implications of this transmission cut both ways: those who are racially tolerant as adults appear to have been more strongly influenced by their pre-adult experiences than
interventions later in life (Miller and Sears 1986); however, those who are racially prejudiced at childhood remain so as adults (Sears and Levy 2003), with such racist sentiments emerging through the process of socialization (McConahay and Hough 1976; Sears 1988; Sears and McConahay 1973). Children’s racial attitudes have been shown to have strong positive correlations to their parents’ own racial sentiments (Gniewosz and Noack 2006).

Group sentiments, whether positive or negative in valence, appear to persist across generations. Whether the persistence of these views has implications for the ways in which citizens come to form opinions is however a question which has however, only been answered in a very limited fashion. Previous work has shown that symbolic racism, the combination of antiblack affect and conservativism (see Sears and Henry (2003) for a detailed discussion of the concept) has been shown to be linked strongly to explicit policy attitudes throughout the course of the life cycle (Henry and Sears 2009); given that symbolic racism is a particularly specific subset of group attitudes, it remains to be seen how one might expect learned group views more generally may be translated into opinion on related issues over time. While research in group-centric public opinion has shown that learned associations between issues and groups lead to increasingly automatic applications of group considerations to opinion, there has been little consideration as to whether these reactions are the product of socialization (meaning the linkages are transmitted) or whether it is merely the group sentiments which are transmitted across generations.

Groups and Opinion

While it may be the case that group considerations are highly influential in the process of forming and expressing opinions, the question remains, why groups as opposed to other
considerations which may be at citizens disposal? Psychologically, the tendency to recognize and categorize the world around us is an inherently natural predilection. Whether a member of a group or not, citizens are capable of perceiving similarities and differences across individuals as part of the natural process of person perception. Categorization of the world around us is hard-wired; to ease the cognitive burdens of daily life we sort the world according to recognizable differences across individuals (Hamilton 1981; Hamilton and Trolier 1986). The process of categorization diminishes the variation of the world allowing us to sort individuals according to relevant categories, each with characteristics and attributions ascribed to them. These groupings are built upon perceptions of similarities with others (Stangor 2004), and how these similarities lead to a sense of identification with those others as a cohesive social group (Hogg, Turner, and Davidson 1990; Turner 1987; Turner and Oakes 1988).

When interacting with others, the social categorizations create a lens through which others may be viewed; considerations of those others, made cognizant automatically, in turn structure our interactions (Stangor 2004). The automaticity of categorization and the extent to which individuals as cognitive misers are forced to rely on such perceptions to manage the complexity of daily life (Bargh 1999) leads perceptions of groups to play a central role. The groups we belong to, whether they originate from physical differences such as race or gender, or social differences, such as partisanship or religion, are central to how we view the world.

*Group-Centric Thinking*

As a result of this inherent predilection to sort and order the world, group perceptions are naturally powerful tools for understanding politics. Citizens organize their thinking in terms of groups (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Lau 1986). This tendency, combined with the need to
rely on informational shortcuts when expressing preferences (Zinni, Rhodebeck, and Mattei 1997) presents elites with visible incentives to emphasize groups in policy debate. Discussing issues in terms of their policy beneficiaries facilitates citizen comprehension by providing them with a point of reference (Schneider and Ingram 1993). When considering policy designed to benefit (or even to punish) a particular group, the proposal itself may be evaluated in the context of an individuals’ views of the group (Brady and Sniderman 1985).

Groups may also be used to influence opinion by emphasizing their role as endorsers of policy outcomes. Knowing what side of the debate a group stands on and how you feel about that group may also powerfully influence opinion on an associated issue (Lupia 1994). In all political circumstances in which groups play a role, one’s sentiments become highly informative cues for forming opinions. Positive sentiment invokes support to a greater extent, while negative sentiments have the opposite effect, as citizens find themselves motivated to protect liked groups and punish disliked groups (Grant and Rudolph 2003).

Unlike ideology and issue-based appeals tied to individual self-interest, or appeals to intrinsically held values, group sentiment is broad-reaching. “Group sentiment is not the only factor in public opinion, but it is almost always present, and of all the diverse opinion ingredients, it is often the most potent” (Kinder 2006a, p. 209). To use group sentiment as an ingredient for opinion requires only that a linkage between issue and group is perceived. Knowledge of such connections should not be taken for granted given the lack of contextual political information in the minds of citizens; however, the identity-to-politics link which brings perceptions of social groups into the decision calculus is very broad-reaching for a simple reason. Groups are influential because “Groups are real because they are psychologically real, and thereby affect the way in which we behave” (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 296).
This joint tendency on the part of citizens to absorb (at least in part) the views of their parents, and the utility of group considerations for making informed political judgments creates a pathway through which group-centric thinking may be shaped. From this general framework, I outline more specific expectations as to how parental characteristics translate into youth views and subsequent opinion.

**Expectations**

While the effects of socialization on political orientations are mixed as a whole, as evidenced by low to moderate correlations between parents and adult offspring across a number of dimensions (Jennings and Niemi 1968), some attitudes, such as partisanship (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009), and, more importantly for this project, views toward social groups have been shown to be more consistently transmitted (Kinder 2006b). Expect that parents with more extreme group sentiments (either positive or negative) should have offspring who better connect their own group considerations to evaluations of related issues, as the salience of issues and political concepts has been shown to enhance transmission of those views between parents and children (Acock and Clarke 1990; Percheron and Jennings 1981; Tedin 1980; Westholm 1999) (H1).

These effects should arguably be amplified both when the parents agree (H2) and when the child agrees with their parents (H3). These expectations stem from findings from previous work on political socialization which demonstrates that increased homogeneity in parental views enhances the transmission of those views to offspring (Bandura 1977; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Tedin 1980), and correspondence between parents and children enhances the persistence of transmitted beliefs (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009).
Data and Measures

To test the effects of parental group orientations on children’s’ reliance on the same group views as adults when evaluating group-targeted policy items I use the first three waves of Jennings and Niemi’s Youth-Parent Political Socialization Study (Jennings and Niemi 1974). The study consists of a first 1965 wave in which 1,669 high school seniors were interviewed, in addition to one or both of their parents and a follow-up in 1973 in which the student sample was reinterviewed, as well as one of the students’ parents. The third wave was a second follow-up in 1982 with the respondents from the initial interview, but no parental interviews.

The Political Socialization data serves as an excellent tool for the analysis of the socializing effects of parental views on group-centric opinions in adulthood given that the dataset contains not only detailed measures of students’ perceptions of their family members, but actual measures of parental views (for 1/3 of the sample, the views of both parents). However, the data are not without their shortcomings; namely the tumultuous periods of American history in which the bulk of the data were collected. One might argue that coming of age in the Civil Rights-Vietnam War era would produce a unique outlook on life when compared to present-day politics. Due to an evolution of social norms toward outward racial bias (Kinder and Sanders 1996) the Political Socialization data could serve as a difficult first test of the transference and persistence of racialized, group-centric thinking.

Dependent Variables

To test the effects of the socialization of group-centric thinking on the expression of adult opinions, I consider two sets of outcome variables, the first measured in 1973 and the second in 1982. In 1973 I consider a series of measures which should be influenced by racialized thought:
opinion toward government aid to minorities, opinion toward school busing, opinion toward the integration of schools, and a fourth issue which, while not overtly racialized, could be implicitly racial: support for government guaranteed jobs and standard of living. In 1982 I reconsider the question of government aid to minorities, school integration, and the government provision of jobs as well as a second, potentially implicitly racialized question, the government provision of services.

**Explanatory Variables**

To predict the extent to which parents’ racial attitudes socialize youth to into group-centric thinking on the racialized policy items, I consider the effects of a set of parental and youth racial attitudes, in addition to a series of controls. Both parent and youth racial attitudes are compiled using feeling thermometers toward African Americans, measured in 1965, 1973, and 1982. Additionally, I include partisanship, ideology, knowledge, and education, measured in 1973 and 1982 respectively.

To test the effects of parents’ attitude salience (H1), I create an extremity measure using the parental feeling thermometer toward African Americans by folding the measure at its midpoint (50 degrees) and rescale the measure to run from 0 to 1. In addition to this measure, I create a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if both parents’ feeling thermometer scores toward African Americans were the same, and 0 otherwise and interact this measure with the

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1 In each year, the feeling thermometers are measured using the standard 100 point scale, running from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm). Parents, when interviewed, were asked to assess their spouse’s racial attitudes separately.

2 Partisanship and ideology are each measured on a seven-point scale, coded to run from Republican (conservative) to Democrat (liberal). Political knowledge is an additive index of six knowledge items (the length of a US Senate term, the country which Tito was a leader, the number of members on the US Supreme Court, the Governor of the respondents’ state, the location of the concentration camps during World War II, and F.D.R.’s partisan identification). Education is a dummy variable for whether respondents have a bachelor’s or other advanced degree.

3 As parents were asked to report their spouse’s attitudes as well, I average the two measures prior to creating the extremity measure and subsequent measures.
measure for parents’ attitudes toward African Americans in 1965. The inclusion of these variables is based upon the expectation that increased similarity between parents enhances transmission from parent to child (H2). Finally, I include a measure of the difference between parents and children (calculated by differencing the youth thermometer measure from the average thermometer rating for both parents) (H3). This variable from -1 suggesting youth are colder toward African Americans than their parents to 1 suggesting youth are warmer toward African Americans than their parents, with 0 indicating no difference. To capture initial socializing experiences, each of these variables is measured in 1965, based on the assumption that these beliefs, originating during youth’s formative years persist into later in life. I also include a measure of youth’s current racial attitudes (measured in 1973 for the 73 analyses and measured in 1982 for the 82 analyses). This measure is rescaled to run from 0 to 1 (coldest to warmest).

Analytic Strategy

Due to the focus on racialized considerations, I focus exclusively on a White subsample of the initial sample of high school seniors, resulting in an initial subsample of 1490 respondents. Due to the panel nature of the data, consisting of multiple observations for each individual, as well as respondents nested within parental households, the data are not independent. Because of this, standard regression models are unsuitable, necessitating a multilevel modeling strategy. In each model, I distinguish between three levels (multiple observations for individuals over time and household). Individuals are nested in their own racial context (as captured by their current racial sentiments) and their parents’ racial attitudes in 1965, to capture the context in which

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<sup>4</sup> These estimates are produced using the gllamm package in STATA (see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004) for documentation).
respondents came of age.⁵ The results for issue opinions in 1973 are presented in Table 1 and opinion in 1982 in Table 2.

Results

The results in Table 1 provide limited support for the expectations outlined above. For only one of the four expressed opinions (aid to minorities), do we see significant effects for parental influence. On the issue of whether the government should provide assistance to members of minority groups, we see a number of interesting results. Youth who are warmer toward African Americans than their parents are more supportive of aid to minorities, suggesting a distancing on the part of youth from their parents in the socialization process. In addition, on average, as parents whose views toward African Americans become warmer (as measured in 1965) lead youth to express greater support when asked in 1973. The dummy variable capturing whether parents’ views coincide is also significant, indicating that youth whose parents’ views toward African Americans were the same are also more supportive of aid to minorities.

Because of the included interaction term between parental attitudes and agreement, the former effect should be taken as the effect when parental views toward African Americans diverge, and the latter should be the effect of parental agreement for youth whose views toward African Americans are cold. The interaction between these measures is also statistically significant, but is positive, suggesting that as parents’ views toward African Americans both coincide and become warmer, their offspring’s opinion in fact becomes less-supportive. Taken together, these are a surprising set of results, suggesting that views from parents do appear to

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⁵ While this strategy may seem somewhat unconventional, I argue that it provides a more accurate measure of the social context than simply indexing respondents by household. Similar results are obtained simply indexing by household.
have some relationship to youth views in adulthood; however, youth’s adult views appear to be a *reaction* to parental views, rather than the *transmission* of those views.

Across the other issues, there is no direct evidence of parental views on youth opinion, as none of the parental variables obtain statistical significance. We do however see consistent effects for present-day youth views toward African Americans; across the four issues (both directly and implicitly racialized issues), strong significant effects are obtained for the feeling thermometer measure of sentiments toward African Americans, with support increasing as feelings toward African Americans become warmer. This suggests the possibility that parental views are operating *indirectly* rather than *directly*, given that youth attitudes originate from their political environment. It may also be the case that there are further unaccounted for socializing factors which are responsible for shaping opinion, something which seems likely given the existing evidence for the socializing effects of schools and the social context outside of the home.

Instead of the expected pattern of findings with respect to familial influence, we see fairly consistent effects for ideology and education, as well as modest effects for partisanship and political knowledge. Such results could be demonstrative of additional antecedents of the socializing experience, which has been linked to enhanced adult political sophistication (Highton 2009) and the acquisition of higher education (Kam and Palmer 2008), which may also be responsible for muting the evidence for the familial socialization of group-centric thinking.

Given the limited evidence for parents group views on youth opinion in early adulthood, I consider also whether these effects could possibly emerge later in life, during a different political era. As such, I engage in a second test of the transmission of parental group-centrism by examine the effects of socializing experiences later in life, using data from the third wave of the
Youth-Parent study in 1982. I run the same models as in Table 1, replacing the controls for youth characteristics for measures taken in 1982, and present these results in Table 2.

Surprisingly, there are very limited effects for either parental or youth group covariates on opinion. Of the parental variables, only two approach conventional levels of significance: the interaction between parental attitudes and parental agreement on opinion toward aid to minorities, and similarity of youth-parent attitudes on support for government guaranteed jobs. As for the youth variables, we see significant effects for youth racial attitudes on the two explicitly racial issues (school integration and aid to minorities), but, surprisingly, not for the implicitly racial ones (government guaranteed jobs and services). Effects are more consistent for the controls, with consistent effects occurring for partisanship, ideology, and political knowledge, but not for education.

These patterns of findings suggest that, while parental views do appear to have an influence on youth views, those effects appear to fade over time. However, before extrapolating too far from these results, it should be noted that the time period of these analyses was one of great political and social change; as such, one could make a strong argument that instability in the effects of racial attitudes could be due to an unaccounted for socializing effect of coming of age during the post-Civil Rights movement America, where racial attitudes simply did not take following transmission from parent to child.

From this point follows an admission of the crudeness of the measures. With the changing nature of society, overt biases and explicit antiblack affect toward African Americans has arguably declined (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Despite such, more nuanced measures of racial and other group attitudes designed to tap conscious considerations beyond simple affect, such as symbolic racism (Sears 1988) and ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam 2009), as well as
subconscious prejudices (through the use of tests such as the Implicit Association Test) (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998) have revealed persisting negative sentiments toward social groups. Given the evolution of social norms over the course of the data collection, the measures included may simply be inadequate to capture group sentiments suggesting a need to extend the study using some of the more innovative measures.

Conclusions

Understanding the processes and implications of political socialization is and continues to be an important domain of study, beyond the development and application of group-centric views. Political socialization is the process through which citizens learn to, “do democracy and civil society” (Sapiro 2004, p. 19). The development of citizens at the hands of their families and the current political context in which they come of age has important implications for the future function of democratic politics; whether citizens come of age relying on their perceptions of social groups as the basis for their opinions, as opposed to other considerations may produce meaningful opinions lacking other information, or may instead lead to the perpetuation of group biases (Palmer 2010).

While group considerations go a long way in informing opinion, to assume that the end product of group-centric appeals is only well-reasoned opinion requires some particular assumptions. The darker side of group-centric thinking lies on its potential to induce bias. Citizens’ views of groups consist of more than simple affective evaluations based upon encounters with members of that group (Stangor 2004). In addition, perceptions of groups also consist of ascribed beliefs about members of the groups, otherwise known as social stereotypes (Fiske 1998; Hamilton and Sherman 1994).
These stereotypes emerge through contact with group members (Aboud and Doyle 1996), as well as being perpetuated by the media (Brown 1995). Regardless of their explicitly expressed level of prejudice (or lack thereof), individuals are aware of these social stereotypes (Devine 1989) which may then be made conscious by group-centric appeals and potentially causing prejudicial judgments. The automaticity of group considerations (including social stereotypes) when faced with group members or a group-relevant judgment (or group-centric appeals) may potentially lead to stereotyping (Dovidio et al. 1986; Fazio et al. 1995) with the guilty party entirely unaware of the bias. Such is the normative danger of a reliance on group considerations to form opinions; the inevitability of prejudice.

The probability of prejudiced opinions at the hands of group-centric cues is but one concern stemming from the reliance on groups to form opinions. In addition to activating existing stereotypical considerations, group-based appeals highlight groups, drawing attention to existing differences across groups. While for many these distinctions serve to organize, simplify, and sharpen the world around us, for some, they do much more. For some, these divisions are more than a simplification of the world; instead they are lines drawn in the sand dividing the world into friend and foe. Such an extreme view of in-groups and out-groups is one component of an ethnocentric worldview (Kinder and Kam 2009), where the ethnocentric are driven to seek benefits for their very limited in-group at the expense of all else. As Kinder and Kam note, the effects of ethnocentrism are far-reaching, with pronounced negative implications for the state of opinion (2009).

This project has sought to explore the sources of such group-centric thought among citizens. While past research has considered the implications of group-centrism for public opinion, very little work has directly considered the origins of this pattern of thinking. As the
results of the analyses here show, group centrisim may be thought to emerge early in life through political socialization. While this project has focused on the family as the principal source of group-centric thought, these arguments could arguably be extended to the political environment generally (Aboud 1988; Miller 1984; Sears and Levy 2003), in particular as work in political socialization broadly has demonstrated that media and peer networks may be as consequential for socialization as family and school (Galston 2001; McDevitt and Chaffee 2000, 2002; McLeod 2000).

Additionally, while this project has focused exclusively on the domain of race as a representation of group-centric thinking, it is not, and should not be thought of as the only way in which groups may influence political thought and the expression of opinion. Social groups form across a plethora of other lines, such a gender, sexual orientation, religiosity, and partisanship, to name a few. Sentiments toward these groups and subsequent group-centric thinking and opinion may also be shaped by the process of familial socialization.
Table 1. Group-Centric Issue Opinion, 1973

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School Integration</th>
<th>Aid to Minorities</th>
<th>School Busing</th>
<th>Government Guaranteed Jobs</th>
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<td>-0.10</td>
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<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
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</table>

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<tr>
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<th>Aid to Minorities</th>
<th>Government Guaranteed Jobs</th>
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</table>

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