A Case Study Approach to LGBT Interest Group Strategies: the 2009 D.C. Marriage Campaign
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Introduction

On December 18th, 2009, gay rights advocates cheered as D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty signed the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act. With the stroke of a pen, Washington D.C. became the sixth place in the nation to offer marriage licenses to same-sex couples. For many Americans, the bill’s passage marked a major victory in the ongoing fight for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) equality. But even in light of this now nearly two-year-old legislative accomplishment, little research has been done on the emerging role of LGBT interest groups. This paper hopes to fill that void, at least in part, by surveying different tactics used by four major gay rights organizations during the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign. Specifically, I look at tactics used by the Campaign for All D.C. Families, D.C. for Marriage, the Gertrude Stein Democratic Club and the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance. Through the use of in-depth interviews with high-ranking LGBT officials, I determine which tactics were most successful in influencing D.C. legislators to vote in favor of marriage equality. In the pages that follow, I argue that the aforementioned LGBT interest groups used a combination of insider and outsider tactics to ensure affirmative votes from members of the D.C. City Council; prevent the U.S. Congress from intervening in the District’s legislative process; and mobilize public support for the proposed legislation, particularly among D.C.’s African-American and religious communities.

Literature Review

Before delving into the heart of the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign, it is important to examine any existing academic literature that is relevant to the topic at hand. And indeed, current research can

\[\text{For the purposes of this paper, the term 'marriage equality' will be used instead of the term 'same-sex marriage.'}\]
be broken down into three main areas of inquiry: interest group formation, interest group tactics and social movements.

**Interest Group Formation**

The origin of interest group formation can be traced back by Arthur F. Bentley and his so-called group interpretation of politics (LaVaque-Manty 2006). An American political scientist and philosopher, Bentley argued that all political activity consists in various “groups pursuing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups…to mediate the adjustments” (as quoted in LaVaque-Manty 2006). Building upon the work of Ludwig Gumplowicz and Georg Simmel, Bentley noted that groups are not static and immutable, but rather malleable and ever-changing (LaVaque-Manty 2006).

He believed that groups, not individuals, are the “primary causal force in society” and that they emerged “as responses of similarly [situated] persons to some particular trigger” (as quoted in LaVaque-Manty 2006). In the case of the Civil Rights Movement, for example, Bentley would argue that African-Americans joined together not because they were all black, but because they were all politically disenfranchised. Bentley also theorized that groups pursue their interests in a space he called the “habit background” (as quoted in LaVaque-Manty 2006). The habit background is the culturally dependent context through which various interest groups express their political desires. According to Bentley, the habit background is constantly in flux and shaped largely by external sociopolitical factors (LaVaque-Manty 2006).

In the mid-to-late 20th century, David Truman provided the first real world application of Bentley’s theoretical framework (LaVaque-Manty 2006). Truman used examples from the American political system to show that there is no such thing as a universal public good (LaVaque-Manty 2006). Like Bentley, Truman believed that all interest groups arose more or less in response to a shared political or economic frustration. This assumption, however, was
later challenged by Macur Olson (LaVaque-Many 2006). Olson believed that people could not be expected to form interest groups once they became aware of a threat to their common interest since only certain people would respond to certain threats (LaVaque-Manty 2006). Nevertheless, Bentley and Truman’s work laid much of the foundation for what we now know about interest group formation. For example, their work became the basis for interest group pluralism—the belief that democracy is a marketplace for competing points of views, and that the federal government should be the final arbiter of those views.

*Interest Group Tactics*

Interest group tactics generally fall into one of two distinct categories: insider tactics, which tend to emphasize cooperation with existing government officials, and outsider tactics, which tend to agitate and exert political pressure on them. Interest groups normally use outsider tactics when dealing with politicians at the local and state level (Patton and Zeigler 2006). This includes the use of “direct mail campaigns, efforts to encourage citizens to contact legislators and...litigation” (Patton and Zeigler 2006). Insider tactics, on the other hand, are used far more frequently at the federal level since they are intended to “build direct and personal relationships” with members of Congress (Patton and Zeigler 2006). Once established, interest groups eventually leverage these personal relationships in private and closed-door negotiations. See Table 1 (below).
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Either way, “tactics chosen [by a particular interest group] appear to be influenced neither by the financial resources available to the group nor by the presence or absence of professional staff” (Browne 1983). They are instead, as Engel (2007) observed, influenced by “organizational identity,” or “how an interest group differentiates itself from allied or competitor organizations.” Engel (2007) noted that organizational identity is “observable through rhetoric, history and public mission statement, and is a structural constraint conditioning the actions of organizational leaders.” Organizational identity largely influences what an organization’s agenda will be, how it will operate and which tactics it will employ.

And to that end, a wide variety of interests are now represented in the American political system, including business and agricultural groups, labor groups, professional associations, public interests groups, ideological groups and public-sector groups (Ginsberg, Lowi and Weir 1999). But regardless of the type, all interest groups share one thing in common: the desire to influence
public policy and procure certain legislative and electoral outcomes. This might be especially true for interest groups who align themselves with social movements such as the women’s right movement, the progressive movement, or of interest here, the LGBT movement.

Social Movements

Social movements are defined as “actors and organizations seeking to alter power deficits and to effect social transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens for sustained political action” (Amenta et al. 2010). By this definition, then, the LGBT movement consists largely in the various actors who want to change America’s heteronormative social and legal institutions. These include marriage, the military, the criminal justice system, the education system and the healthcare system. Many scholars disagree on whether social movements are effective (Baumgartner and Mahoney 2005) or politically insignificant (Giugni 2007). Whatever the case may be, there are three major schools of thought on the origin of social movements. They are the classical model, the resource mobilization model and the political process models.

The classical model posits that social movements are the result of some strain that exists in the social infrastructure (Bostic 2010). According to this theory, people join social movements not to advocate for a particular policy outcome, but to manage the psychological disruption caused by some economic or social distress in their lives (Bostic 2010). Alternatively, the resource mobilization model argues that social movements stem from the amount of resources made readily accessible to an unorganized yet politically agitated group (Bostic 2010). Proponents of the resource mobilization model believe that social movements represent an important conduit through which resources flow from an elite group to a disenfranchised group. These two theories dominated much of the academic literature on social movements until Doug McAdams offered his political process model in 1982 (Bostic 2010).
The political process model “relies on the notion that a social movement is a continuous phenomenon that thrives on the interplay of four factors:

- Emergence of broad socioeconomic processes that expand the capacity for more political opportunities over an extended period of time
- Readiness of the indigenous organizations when the political opportunities become available
- Emergence of a collective consciousness among the challenging groups that encourages the belief that the movement is leading in a successful direction.
- Ability to win the support of external groups in order to broaden the opposition against the conservative political structure” (Boston 2010).

The Political Process Model filled in many of the gaps left by the classical model and resource mobilization because it acknowledged for the first time the importance of sociopolitical factors such as group consciousness, political timing and organizational strength (Engel 2007). And indeed, such factors were largely responsible for the birth of the LGBT movement.

**History of the LGBT Movement & Politics**

For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Americans did not view themselves as homosexuals, bisexuals or even heterosexuals (Chauncey 1995). This was due almost entirely to the fact that sexual orientation was not yet seen as a basis for social identity (Chauncey 1995). For most Americans, sex constituted a specific type of behavior, not a specific type of person. While “homosexual behavior was classified under the category of sodomy, which [also] included adultery, fornication, oral-genital sex, and sex with animals,” there was no such thing as ‘a homosexual’ (Seidman
This was undoubtedly the case until sometime between 1890 and 1920 when “the homosexual” first emerged in newspaper reports and court trials “as a distinct sexual type” (Seidman 2010). In New York City, for example, self-identified homosexuals soon began sharing social spaces with their self-identified heterosexual counterparts (Chauncey 1995). Clubs, bars, ballrooms and certain streets eventually found themselves overrun with groups of working-class gay men and women (Chauncey 1995).

Homosexuals and heterosexual were not treated the same, however. American doctors and scientists generally agreed that homosexuals were “deviant and abnormal” (Seidman 2010). Some believed that homosexuality was a form of gender abnormality. They argued that homosexual men were women trapped inside male bodies, and that homosexual women were women trapped inside male bodies (Seidman 2010). Others believed that homosexuals were pathological sexual deviants in need of legal sanctions and/or medical treatment (Seidman 2010). This characterization eventually took hold and “individuals who felt desire for persons of the same sex had to struggle with self-images as sexual and gender deviants” (Seidman 2010). They had to deal with the constant fear of being thrown in jail or institutionalized in a medical facility. Unsurprisingly, “there was very little political action advocating their rights” (Seidman 2010).

This all changed, however, when a “national politics by and for homosexuals” developed for the first time during the 1950s (Seidman 2010). World War II was critical in starting this new wave of political activity since homosexual liaisons were formed during the war (Chauncey 1995). Once the war ended, many soldiers relocated to coastal cities like New York City and San Francisco because these places were generally much more tolerant of homosexuality. They allowed soldiers to visit gay bars and form gay networks without fear of societal condemnation (Chauncey 1995). Homosexual women also found refuge during the war since they were forced to live, eat, work and sleep together (Chauncey 1995).
Indeed, “living without men for often long periods of time made it possible for some men [and women] to explore their homosexual feelings” (Seidman 2010). This increased interaction between gay men and women eventually led to an increased group consciousness as well as the emergence of “two new national organizations dedicated to homosexual well-being: “the Mattachine Society, which represented men, and the Daughters of Bilitis, which represented women” (Seidman 2010). Mainstream society, however, viewed this increase in political activity as a threat to the American way of life and responded with “an unprecedented national campaign to suppress and criminalize homosexuality” (Seidman 2010). Gay men and women were beaten, harassed and subject to blatant discrimination by the local, state and federal government (Chauncey 1995). Police officers soon began raiding gay-friendly bars, businesses and bath houses on a regular basis. Things continued like this until they eventually culminated in the Stonewall Riots of 1969.

On June 27, 1969, New York City police officers conducted a routine raid of the Stonewall Inn, a popular hangout for gay men and women (New York Times 2009). Though it was not unusual for the New York Police Department to target homosexual bars and clubs, it was extremely unusual for patrons to take action and respond physically to the police attacks. But that is exactly what happened at the Stonewall Inn. According to the New York Times (2009),

“The Stonewall rebellion was a defining moment in the history of the gay rights movement. That uprising awakened gay men and lesbians to the idea that they were being attacked as a group. That, in turn, awakened them to the idea that they needed to organize as a group.”

Gays and lesbians “developed a strong sense of social justice” after the Stonewall Riots (Seidman 2010). The riots “helped them launch a national gay and lesbian movement” equipped with its own actors,
activists and advocacy groups (Seidman 2010). In fact, many of the LGBT interest groups we know today emerged soon after what happened at Stonewall, including ACT UP (1983), Queer Nation (1990), the Human Rights Campaign (1980), the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (1973), the Lambda Legal Defense Fund (1973) and the Gay and Lesbian Victory Fund (1991) (Engel 2010).

The advent of these organizations encouraged gays and lesbians to view “homosexuality as a social and political identity” (Seidman 2010). And since its inception, the LGBT movement has developed in three major ways: First, “gays and lesbians have focused much of their social and political energy on community building” (Seidman 2010). Second, “the gay movement no longer aims merely for tolerance or to eliminate discrimination,” but rather “full social equality” (Seidman 2010). Finally, “gays...entered the mainstream and gained acceptance, however incompletely” (Seidman 2010). These three factors set a new political environment for LGBT interest groups and encouraged them to pursue a number of different policy outcomes, including among other things, the extension of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

**Marriage Equality in the District**

*Background*

Though Washington D.C. was the sixth place in the nation to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the situation in D.C. differed greatly from the ones in Connecticut, Vermont, Massachusetts, Iowa and New Hampshire. First and foremost, Washington D.C. has long had a majority-minority population, with nearly 55% of its residents identifying as African-American (Jones 2010). Second, the U.S. Congress and the D.C. City Council have long shared concurrent legal jurisdiction over all matters that take place in the nation’s capital (Alexander and Marimow 2010). Third, and perhaps most important of all, Washington D.C. began enacting
Consider that, in 1972, “the D.C. School Board [passed] a resolution prohibiting discrimination within the school system based on sexual orientation” (Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance 2010). It was “the nation's first such resolution by a school board” (Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance 2010). In 1973, the district “[became] the first major American city to outlaw discrimination against gays in housing, employment and public accommodations” (Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance 2010). The city continued down this pro-LGBT path for the next twenty years—decriminalizing sodomy between consenting adults in 1981; allocating emergency funds to AIDS research in 1983; passing LGBT-inclusive hate crimes legislation in 1990 and providing domestic partnerships to same-sex couples in 2002 (Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance 2010).

So when D.C. City Councilman David Cataña introduced the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act in October of 2009, gay rights activists saw it as the perfect opportunity to build upon the city’s pro-gay legislative history. (Craig 2009). Many activists and advocacy groups were involved in the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign. But this paper looks at the four groups who emerged as the most prominent and outspoken members of the coalition: the Campaign for All D.C. Families, D.C. for Marriage, the Gertrude Stein Democratic Club and the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance.

Campaign for All D.C. Families

The Campaign for All D.C. Families “[represented] a diverse coalition of District of Columbia residents working to win and secure civil marriage equality” (Campaign for all D.C. Families). The organization “envisions marriage equality as an important means to securing equal rights, enhancing quality of life and furthering the human rights legacy of all the people of the District of Columbia” (Campaign for all D.C. Families). Among other things, the group
“[coordinated] with a diverse coalition of D.C. communities,”
“[worked] with the D.C. council, residents of all backgrounds and
economic strata, organizations and Congress,” “[fostered]
collaboration between local and national organization,” and
ultimately, “[worked] to secure support from non-D.C. residents and
entities that acknowledge and respect civil marriage and D.C.’s right
to home rule” (Campaign for all D.C. Families).

D.C. for Marriage
D.C. for Marriage is a local gay rights and grass roots
advocacy organization made up of a “group of local residents
working to retain equal rights and responsibilities for same sex
couples in the District of Columbia” (D.C. for Marriage).

Gertrude Stein Democratic Club
The Gertrude Stein Democratic Club is one of the oldest and
largest LGBT clubs in the nation. It describes itself as the “the voice
of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) Democrats in the
District of Columbia (Gertrude Stein Democratic Club). It was
established in 1976 and is a founding chapter of the National
Stonewall Democrats. It maintains active members in each of the
[eight] wards of the District of Columbia and rallies around local and
national issues. The organization also gets deeply involved in electoral
races in the District of Columbia.

Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance
Founded in 1971, the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance
(GLAA) is a self-described “volunteer, non-partisan, non-profit
advocacy [organization], with a local Washington, D.C. focus” (Gay
and Lesbian Activist Alliance). They characterize themselves as
“Ameria’s oldest continuously active organization devoted to gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender civil rights” (Gay and Lesbian
Activist Alliance 2011). Some of their major initiatives from 2010
included: “marriage and the family,” “public health,” “public safety
and the judiciary,” “human rights,” “public education and youth” and “consumers and businesses” (Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance).

**Argument and Methodology**

The rest of this paper focuses on data collected from in-depth interviews I conducted with high-ranking officials from each of the aforementioned organizations during the week of April 10th, 2011. Based on the qualitative data I collected from those interviews, I found that insider tactics were used to ensure that members of the D.C. City Council did indeed vote in favor of the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act. Insider tactics were also used to prevent the U.S. Congress from taking action during the bill’s 30-day review period wherein Congress has the ability to overturn any piece of legislation passed by the D.C. City Council. Additionally, I found that outsider tactics were used to mobilize public support for the proposed legislation, especially among D.C.’s African-American and religious communities. For the purposes of this paper, I define insider tactics as tactics used to emphasize cooperation with legislators; whereas, outsider tactics are defined as tactics used to agitate and exert political pressure on existing government officials. After highlighting some key findings, I conclude with a general discussion of what my research contributes to the existing scholarship on LGBT interest groups and the tactics they use.

**Findings**

- Hypothesis One: LGBT interest groups used insider tactics to ensure affirmative votes from members of the D.C. City Council.

There was little doubt as to whether the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act would become law in
Washington D.C. As one official from the Campaign for All D.C. Families said:

“Going back, there’s been history of groups like [the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance] and Gerstein Democratic Club that we would not endorse candidates over the years [that] did not support marriage equality or LGBT rights. And we would put those questions to candidates. By the time the issue [of marriage for same-sex couples] came up, we already knew where 80% of our councilmen were.”

By the time the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act came up for a vote, LGBT interest groups involved in the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign had already established the sorts of personal relationships needed to successfully negotiate with D.C. legislators. An official from the Gay and Lesbian Alliance put it this way:

“In many cases, we knew council members before they joined the Council, not only because of our candidate ratings process but because we already knew them as community activists, Council staff members, or Board of Education members.”
Many of the officials I spoke with indicated that the use of insider tactics did indeed solidify support from the vast majority of the District’s elected officials. According to an official from the Campaign for All D.C. Families, the only real question for gay rights activists “was where three council members stood at the time: Harry Thomas of Ward 5, Yvette Alexander of Ward 7 and Marion Barry of Ward 8.” And to that end, insider tactics were used to successfully lobby Harry Thomas of Ward 5 to vote in favor of the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act. Table 2 (to the right) shows the breakdown of the first and final reading on the bill which occurred on December 1, 2009 and December 15, 2009, respectively. The two votes were identical with only Yvette Alexander of Ward 7 Marion Barry of Ward 8 voting “NO”.

Gay rights activists worked closely with members of the D.C. City’s council to garner their public support for the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act and to ensure that they cast affirmative votes during the first and final reading of the bill. Activists leveraged their personal relationships with various members on the council to procure a desired legislative outcome.

- Hypothesis Two: LGBT interest groups used insider tactics to help prevent the U.S. Congress from taking action during the District’s 30-day review period.

Though D.C. Mayor Adrian Fenty signed the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act just days after
it passed the legislature, gay rights activists knew the battle was not completely over. Congress still had 30-days to review, and possibly overturn, the legislation. Keeping that in mind, gay rights activists used insider tactics once again to help dissuade members of Congress from intervening in the District’s legislative process. An official from the Campaign for All D.C. Families said bluntly that “D.C.’s relationship with the Congress is the reason for the Campaign for All D.C. Families. Our lobbyists [were] up on the Hill influencing legislators to [make] sure that Congress [did] not overrule it. [We] worked with the Log Cabin Republicans, [at] both [the] local and the national level, to tell the Republican Party to stay out of it.”

Though Democrats controlled the House, the Senate and the White House in 2009, this did not stop LGBT interest groups from working closely alongside D.C. Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton to, as she said, “close the gate on overturning the bill” (Craig 2010). An official from Campaign for All D.C. Families remembered that “we ended up talking to Barney Frank, Tammy Baldwin. We also talked to members who we knew would be crucial allies. We meet with the staff of Senator Reid. Yes, we worked quietly to make sure people knew what could happen. I think we were very lucky. It happened at a time were nothing did happen. There were a couple of Utah Republicans who introduced a bill. There were a number of Senators who did an amicus brief. It was never a big threat. We met with Democrats and Republicans, like Susan Collins, to make sure DC Home Rule is upheld.”

• Hypothesis Three: LGBT interest groups used outsider tactics to mobilize public support for marriage equality,
particularly among D.C.’s African-American and religious communities.

Gay rights activists spent a substantial amount of time and resources mobilizing public support. One official from D.C. for Marriage pointed out that

“during the time we were organizing, we didn’t know whether there would be a ballot measure. It really helped us to have public support and not have it be as dramatic as it has been in other places such as Maryland. We did a lot of work reaching out to communities of color and religious leaders. Looking at past fights, we knew there would be an effort by the National Organization Marriage to divide the public along racial lines. We need it would be best to have people of color and of faith to stand up publicly in favor of same-sex marriage. We were in Marion’s Barry Ward to support the measure. We were across the city.”

This sentiment was shared by all of the officials I spoke with who worked on the campaign. An official from the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance described how:

“it was important for us to show public support for our efforts because of the power that the U.S. Congress has over D.C. under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. That is why we wrote the op-eds, created talking points flyers (which we translated into Spanish in order to reach the District’s sizeable Latino community), developed relationships with local opinion makers including Washington Post columnist Colbert I. King, and helped develop the voter opinion poll commissioned by the Foundation for All D.C. Families in 2006.”
Garnering public support for marriage equality played a central role in the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign because it made it that much easier for lawmakers to support the bill. As one official from Campaign for All D.C. Families said, “HRC [The Human Rights Campaign] did some polling. And we showed it to the members of the Council. We showed the Council that the support was there. Sometimes you need to show your council some support.” Garnering support from the public also made it much harder for Congress to intervene in the matter and for marriage opponents to gain any traction in the city. It was especially important for gay rights activists to engage communities of color since African-Americans make up a majority of D.C.’s overall population. An official from D.C. for Marriage made the point that

“…we could have done this [enact the Religious Freedom and Civil Marriage Equality Amendment Act] silently. I made the case that we should be very public. That is the sort of things that humanize us. I remember having a conversation with an older African-American on the way to church. By focusing on public education, we made it that much harder for our opponents to mischaracterize or defeat us.”

Gay rights activists learned that lesson the hard way from the Proposition 8 case in California. In 2008, proponents of marriage equality failed miserably to engage California’s African-American and Hispanic communities. According to an article in the Washington Post,

“Seven in 10 African Americans who went to the polls voted yes on Proposition 8, the ballot measure overruling a state Supreme Court judgment that legalized same-sex marriage and brought 18,000 gay and lesbian couples to Golden State courthouses in the past six months.
Similar measures passed easily in Florida and Arizona. It was closer in California, but no ethnic group anywhere rejected the sanctioning of same-sex unions as emphatically as the state’s black voters, according to exit polls. Fifty-three percent of Latinos also backed Proposition 8, overcoming the bare majority of white Californians who voted to let the court ruling stand (Vick and Surdin 2008).”

Clearly, had LGBT interest groups not made a concerted effort to engage those communities traditionally opposed to LGBT equality (e.g. African-Americans, Latinos and evangelicals), there is a great likelihood that the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign would have suffered the same fate as the one in California.

Conclusion

Ask whether the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign was a success, an official from the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance immediately said that it

“…was a resounding success. [The 2009 D.C. marriage campaign] was a result of our thorough preparation, careful legislative and political strategizing, coalition building that included strong participation and leadership from the African American and faith communities, and civic engagement by members of the LGBT community in neighborhoods across the District for the past four decades.”

And while marriage equality was indeed a hard fought victory for the District’s LGBT community, it is important to acknowledge many of the factors that helped make it a reality. First and foremost, D.C. has had a long history of enacting pro-LGBT legislation dating all the way back to the 1970s. Second, D.C. is a majority-minority city with an overwhelmingly liberal electorate. Third, D.C. is governed by a
City Council made up of 13 elected politicians and a single mayor. Moreover, all of its laws are subject to review by the U.S. Congress and can be quite easily overturned. But even in spite of all these exigent circumstances, there are some important lessons to be learned from the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign:

1. LGBT interest groups tactics seem to work best when activists utilize a combination of insider and outsider strategies.
2. LGBT interest group tactics seem to be most effective in a city or state with a long-standing history of taking incremental steps toward LGBT equality.
3. LGBT interest group tactics seem to be most successful when activists work together at the local, state and federal level.
4. And lastly, it is especially important for LGBT interest groups to engage communities traditionally opposed to gay and transgender equality, regardless of whether they are in the majority or the minority.

When asked whether there is anything to learn from the 2009 D.C. marriage campaign, an official from D.C. for Marriage summed it up this way:

“I think other groups should look at what we did in D.C. and use that as a model. I think our focus on public outreach, amplifying same-sex couples, engaging communities of color, and not ceding face to our opponents can be built into really robust campaigns for marriage around the country.”

I believe that further research should explore how gay rights activists and LGBT interest groups win in areas that do not have such a long history of enacting pro-LGBT legislation. It should also focus on understanding community dynamics in areas that have been resistant thus far to the gay rights movement (e.g. places in the Midwest and Deep South). Conducting this type research will undoubtedly help
the LGBT movement make important strides in places all around the country.
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Appendix A

Survey sent to high-ranking officials at the Campaign for All D.C. Families, D.C. For Marriage, the Gertrude Stein Democratic Club and the Gay and Lesbian Activist Alliance

Directions: Thank you for participating in this survey. Rest assured that no one will ever link your name or affiliation with any of the responses you provide below. Please answer each and every question to the best of your ability. Completed surveys can be emailed to Noel Gordon

Describe your organization and the role you play in that organization.

1. What do you believe to be the mission of the organization?

2. What tactics does your organization typically use to reach its mission? Do they tend to be more “insider” (such as negotiating with elected officials) or more “outsider” (such as protests, rallies and other grass roots advocacy)? Does your organization use both?

3. Would you consider your organization to be LGBT affiliated? If so, what sorts of issues does your organization tackle pertaining to the LGBT community?

4. Do the tactics that your organization uses for LGBT issues differ from the ones you cited in question three (3)? Why or why not?

5. What role, if any, did your organization play in the 2009 campaign for same-sex marriage in Washington D.C.? What prompted your organization to play such a role?
6. What other organizations did you work with during the campaign? How important was this collaboration?

7. Did your organization use any particular tactics for the D.C. marriage campaign? Which tactics proved more or less effective in your opinion?

8. Describe your organization's relationship with the D.C. City Council. How did it come to be that way?

9. Describe your organization's relationship with the U.S. Congress. How did it come to be that way?

10. How important was it to mobilize public support for same-sex marriage in the D.C. campaign? How did you do it?

11. Do you think the D.C. marriage campaign was a success? If so, what factors do you think made it such a success?

12. Is there anything else you would like to add that would give me a better sense of your organization's role in the D.C. marriage campaign?