Abstract
The conflict in Somalia has continued for over 20 years, amidst several attempts to mitigate the situation. This has caused Somalia to top Foreign Policy’s Failed State Index from 2008 through 2011. In this thesis, I examined and analyzed reports, policies, and efforts from several governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental agencies. The United States, the United Nations, and the African Union have all tried to resolve the conflict, with efforts ranging from diplomacy to military force. The goal of these analyses was to move forward from the past failures in Somalia and recommend untried policies to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, I briefly mapped out the geopolitical significance of Somalia concerning its history, culture, and climate, and described how these play a role in the ongoing conflict. I came to the conclusion that any solution must be two-pronged, starting with an end to the violence, before negotiations or mediation of any kind can be tried.
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VIII. References
I. Introduction
From 2008 to 2011, Somalia, a small African nation ravaged by civil war and enduring conflict, has topped the list of failed states on the Failed State Index, produced jointly by Foreign Policy and The Fund for Peace (2011). In this paper, the ongoing conflict in Somalia will be mapped, the regional context will be explained, and possible solutions to the conflict will be explored. The need to explore the ongoing conflict is essential to the future of Eastern Africa, regardless of the importance deemed to Somalia by the international community. A deeper look into the problem shows that the civil conflict not only affects Somalia on the national level, but its effects ripple throughout the region and the international community. Not only do destructive political instability, devastating violence, and crippling famine lead to struggle on the national level, but refugee issues with neighboring states and indiscriminate piracy also affects both the regional and international community. Somalia has fallen victim to the realist point of view of the international community, which is that states will act in the best interests of themselves, defining their interests by power gains. States have only aided Somalia sporadically, and the aid has not been long lasting, this argument is a bit tenuous since Somalia is effectively a failed state. The realist doctrine of acting in the best interest of the state might actually apply to a state that has complete control of its territory. The issue is more complex than just resolving the conflict, first the fighting must be stopped, and then the conflict must be resolved. This can be done either by ceasefire or by precipitating an environment that would bring about a hurting stalemate—where sides realize that fighting is no longer worth the costs—for parties to the conflict. The issue of the civil war in Somalia has been the target of many humanitarian and peace keeping missions, but the conflict still rages on.
To continue this paper, the conflict will be introduced and the specific reasons for ongoing conflict will be explained. Then, the parties to the conflict (i.e. clans, radical groups) will be broken down. The context of the conflict will then be explored on the national,
regional, and international levels. With the context kept in mind, three options for a resolution to the conflict will be proposed, and one will be recommended. The solution is two-fold, before any negotiations can be done, a respected ceasefire needs to be achieved. Then, it will be up to institutions such as the United Nations Security Council, the African Union Mission in Somalia, Somaliland, and/or Indonesia to lead negotiations or mediations to provide a long lasting peace in the State. It would be useful to, in a nutshell provide the general outline of the solution at this point. This will give the reader a sense of what to expect in the latter part of this paper.

II. Background of Somali State and Conflict

“The tangible cause of Somalia’s civil wars derives from a militarist state and its brutal repression of a vibrant social reality. In a deeper, historical sense, the state’s collapse represents a classic mismatch between the post-colonial state and the nature and structure of civil society” (Hussein 1999). This statement, made by Adam M. Hussein, in the book Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, sums up the reason why Somalia is a failed state. Somalia historically has never been overly wealthy, as its economy has remained essentially agrarian, amidst industrial and post-industrial economies. In the wake of the Cold War, many African states, including Somalia on the Eastern coast in an area known as the Horn of Africa, were battlegrounds fueling the fight between Communism and Democracy. Eastern African states were of interest to both superpowers because of their geological positioning, allowing the United States access to the Middle East to thwart the spread of Communism, while allowing the Soviet Union to do the opposite. Somalia was stuck in a costly limbo between aid from the United States and the Soviet Union, depending on which side was providing aid in the region at the time. Once the Cold War ended, like many of the other African “swing” states, interest in Somalia quickly faded away, as realist politics dictated that these states no longer had any value to the hegemonic powers. This left Somalia – and other African nations – susceptible to the famines and war that would eventually ravage much of Africa. The actions of hegemonic states left the region with a base built on sand, not stone,
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meaning that the Colonial and Cold War powers only built up what was needed to exploit the African states. This left Somalia without the proper knowledge of how to sustain and govern itself, leading to the eventual implosion. A little mention of the role of Siad Barre in taking the country down the path of failure might be useful at this point. Maybe the author does this later? I believe the information on page 8 will suffice for this, as the goal is resolution going forward.

Somalia is broken up into three regions, two being autonomous, and one pushing for independence. The regions of Somaliland and Puntland are autonomous, and have, in 2010, settled a long conflict between them (IRIN 2010). It is a nation that consists of mostly followers of the Muslim faith, but ethnically Somalia is African, not Arabic. Somalia is a mostly homogeneous nation, but within Somalia there are many clans and sub-clans that are descendent from the male (father’s) bloodline (Elmi 2010). The conflict has evolved to contain five major clan-families, they are; Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaaq, and Rahanweyn (consisting of Digil and Mirifle clans) (Hussein 1999). While most of these clans share a language, religion, and have a similar culture, the clannism in Somalia has taken the place of conflicts over ethnicity (Hussein 1999). The evolution to clan violence happened as a retaliation to a subset of nomenklatura. Nomenklatura was introduced to Somalia by the Soviets and it “involves appointing loyal political agents to guide and control civil and military institutions” (Hussein 1999). Barre took this nomenklatura and turned it into “clan-klatura,” which was coined as such because Barre would bring loyal, trusted clansmen into political positions (Hussein 1999). Most of these appointed officials were members of Barre’s clan, the Darod clan (Hussein 1999), which led to the rise of opposition clans to Barre’s oppressive regime.

Major-General Mohamad Siyad Barre can be blamed for much of the ongoing conflict in Somalia. Barre took over Somalia and started a military regime in 1969, at the height of the Cold War, and was successfully able to centralize power, for the short term. Violence originally broke out in 1980 as clans formed opposition groups to Barre’s regime (Hussein 1999). The fall of Barre’s regime came at the feet of the Somali National Movement (SNM), supported by the Isaaq clan and led by General Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The downfall began in 1988 when the SNM led military operations that successfully barricaded Barre’s forces in towns and bases for two years (Hussein 1999). A root issue to the enduring conflict in Somalia is the climate post-state collapse and the rise of clannism as a form of governance.
According to a study done by the World Bank entitled “Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics,” “clannism and clan cleavages are a source of conflict—used to divide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult to achieve” (World Bank 2005). Clans began the fighting for control of the government after the collapse of the Barre regime; without a successor to the regime, the central government imploded leaving Somalia in an anarchical state of being. The conflict—while it started as a fight for power—quickly became about the acquisition of wealth and material power, and less about control of the government. As mentioned about the famine, food from aid also fuels clan conflict, as this food is used to broker profits by clans (World Bank 2005).

Another, newer party to the conflict in Somalia is the outbreak of radical Islamic group al-Shabaab, which as of 2012 has joined Al-Qaeda and is now officially recognized as a terrorist organization (CNN Wire Staff 2012). Formed in 2006, out of the fall of the Islamic Court of Justice, al-Shabaab has amassed a substantial militia with numbers of soldiers estimated to be well into the thousands (Laing 2012). Al-Shabaab controls much of Southern Somalia—near the border with Kenya—and observes strict Sharia Law (Laing 2012).

Islamic states, under Sharia Law, by definition are theocracies, meaning that religious texts are law and should be adhered to strictly (Duhaime n.d.).

III. Reasons for/Results of Conflict

With a lack of a central government, there is little to no regulation of the waters off the coast of Somalia. This has led to a proliferation of piracy, causing turmoil for not only states in the region reliant on the trade in the Arabian and Red Seas, but also for the states sending their citizens and ships into pirate infested waters. Piracy has occurred since the early stages of the civil war, and most pirates are based in the Puntland region of Somalia, which is one of the poorest (Africa Economic Development Institute 2009). Piracy has become both a reason for and a result of conflict. Many Somalis resort to piracy because of the lack of resources and ways to become
financially secure. Many of the pirates are ex-fisherman who are only that because of the extreme overfishing that has occurred off the Somali coast.

Struggle among the clans lies almost completely in the realms of resources and power and the two are closely knit. Outside of urban arenas, resources such as arable land, water, and livestock fuel conflicts between the more nomadic clans (Elmi 2010). On the urban front, more complex resources are the focus of battle. These resources, according to Afyare Abdi Elmi, include state-power, weapons, jobs, and foreign-aid (Elmi 2010). Clans fight over control of the cities and political power; meaning that those clans which control entire cities control much more of the power politically and are able to have more influence with the international community.
In Somalia, resources that are necessary to live are much scarcer than elsewhere in the world, which makes them a focal point of conflict. Being a state with an abundance of coastland, the sea is heavily relied on for resources. The fact that the sea is so heavily relied on leaves resources vulnerable to Somali pirates who take advantage of the work that legitimate enterprises do. Somalia has nearly 3,300km of unprotected coastland, which is juxtaposed to one of the richest
fishing areas left in the world (ThalifDeen 2012). What also exacerbates the conflict over resources is the harsh famines that happen throughout most of Somalia. Shown clearly in this map are the terrible conditions in certain areas of Somalia, with some areas being in critical and very critical condition. This is a strong motivation for conflict as resources in a famine are scarce, and with a lack of governance there is no system for fair and non-violent resource sharing. In the summer of 2011, a massively destructive famine hit the Horn of Africa; especially Somalia—due to the already depleted resources as a result of conflict. The famine left tens of thousands Somalis dead due to malnutrition, three million in need of urgent aid, and 10 million more at the risk of starvation (The New York Times 2011). This famine did not go unnoticed by the international community, as the United Nations (U.N.) sent large amounts of food to Somalia, in an effort to combat the famine (Houreld 2012). The U.N. efforts to combat the famine in government-controlled Mogadishu did not go as planned, as the conflict fueled actions of factions, including what government is left, which led to much of the aid falling into the black market or being plundered by government officials (Houreld 2012). Two areas of Southern Somalia were declared to be suffering from famine; both areas are under control of the radical Islamic group, Al-Shabaab, who have forced out Western Aid and have accrued many restrictions from the United States and other states (The New York Times 2012). Famine and the subsequent lack of resources is not the only reason for conflict, but it is a pressing one as it is not due to actions of any single faction.

IV. Parties to the Conflict
There are many parties to the conflict in Somalia due to the nature of clannism. Clans are not the only players in the conflict, as the emergence of the Islamic radical group al-Shabaab has fueled conflict. Al-Shabaab means “The Youth,” in Arabic, according to news source Al Jazeera (Al-Jazeera 2011). Al-Shabaab’s goal in the conflict is to claim central control and impose strict Islamic Sharia law throughout Somalia. Al-Shabaab has risen from the ashes of the
former Islamic Courts Union (ICU), who rose to challenge the
interim Transitional Federal Government (TFG) starting in 2006. Al-
Shabaab started as the military wing of the ICU, and is the largest
opposition group to the TFG (Al-Jazeera 2011). Under the ICU,
Adan Hashi Farah—known as Ayro—was appointed as the leader of
al-Shabaab, and is believed to have trained in Afghanistan (Al-Jazeera
2011). In 2008, Ayro was killed by a United States missile strike; since
then al-Shabaab has had several leaders, but is led as of 2012, by
Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair (CNN Wire Staff 2012). As mentioned
before, al-Shabaab has now been linked with al-Qaeda as their
allegiance has been pledged to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-
Zawahiri. A message from al-Zubair to al-Zawahiri states, "On behalf
of the soldiers and the commanders in Al-Shabaab, we pledge
allegiance to you. So lead us to the path of jihad and martyrdom that
was drawn by our imam, the martyr Osama" (CNN Wire Staff 2012)

The group has opposition from both the African Union (AU) in the
capital Mogadishu and in the south with Kenyan forces retaliating to
kidnapping incidents (CNN Wire Staff 2012).

The major clans in Somalia that are parties to the conflict are the
Darod, Dir, Hawiye, and the Isaaq clans. The Rahanweyn clan has
formed the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA), believed to be under
the authority of the TFG. These clans are mostly pastoral nomads,
and make up approximately 75% of the Somali population (Rinehard
2011). The clan system in Somalia allows for members of these clans
to have protection and access to resources, which they would not
have on their own (Rinehard 2011). Though seemingly advantageous,
the lineages of these large clans became too large and convoluted to
function as efficient political bodies (Hansen 2003). Because of the
convoluted nature of large clans spanning substantial portions of the
population, a system of sub-lineages emerged to better represent the
people at a grassroots level (Hansen 2003). The clan system works
hierarchically, as elders are appointed based on age, merit, and other
values that are deemed positive by the clan. The position of the
elders in clans are paradoxical in nature, as they can be both sources
of conflict or peacekeepers. As stated in the World Bank report on
drivers of conflict in Somalia, most of the fighting in Somalia post-1991 has been in the name of a clan, as well as most of the mediation has been done through clan elders; by way of customary law and blood payments (World Bank 2005). Somali clans are active throughout the state, but fighting is concentrated in Southern and Central Somalia, as seen with the various clans in Mogadishu.
Rebel groups and clans are not the only factions that play a role in the conflict; Somali pirates also add another dimension, on a national, regional, and international level. While not a clearly defined group, Somali pirates account for massive loss of revenue coming into the area. Most pirates are arranged along clan dichotomies (Blanchard et al. 2009). In 2009, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon warned that some pirate factions may, “now rival established Somali authorities in terms of their military capabilities and resource bases” (Blanchard et al. 2009). Reports in 2009 led researchers to believe that there were three main pirate groups, one in each of the Northern region, Central region, and Southern region: The most active of which is the Northern group, in Puntland (Blanchard et al. 2009). Without a stable government, a streamlined approach to the seas—with naval enforcement—is almost impossible, as the makeshift Somali coast guard does not have the resources to fend off pirates (Blanchard et al. 2009). The motives of these pirate groups was summed up in 2008—that have not changed today—by the UN Special Representative to Somalia, who said, “Poverty, lack of employment, environmental hardship, pitifully low incomes, reduction of pastoralist and maritime resources due to drought and illegal fishing and a volatile security and political situation all contribute to the rise and continuance of piracy in Somalia.” (Blanchard et al. 2009)

Amidst the fighting for power and resources, there are plans for a federalist-based system in the sights for some clans. Their specific plans, and how they differ, is another source of conflict. Though there have been proposed plans for federalist approaches to governance in Somalia, Somalia does not have the organization to govern at the local, regional, and national levels (Elmi 2011). Not only does Somalia lack the organizational competence to create a federation, they also do not have fully agreed upon regions to create a
regionally based system of governance. In the Northern regions of Somalia, pro-federalists want two regions, while those in the Puntland region call for a system with four to five regions (Elmi 2011). There are other plans that have been brought forth; members of the Darod clan has called for a system based on the 18 regions left after the Barre regime, and members of the Hawiye clan have called for a return to the eight regions that were in place prior to the Barre regime (Elmi 2011). This system is ambitious and unrealistic within the context of the conflict, because Somalia does not have the resources, economic stability, or organization to pull a federal system together. Without a true central government with performance legitimacy to successfully and efficiently run this type of government, the fact that there is ongoing conflict is moot. The external impressions of these plans may seem positive, but at their core, they are based around each clan’s plan to maximize their gain.

V. National, Regional, and International Context of the Conflict

Establishing the context of a conflict on every level is essential to the advancement towards a resolution. Context must be established from the bottom-up, starting—in this paper—at the national level. For Somalia, the national context is quite straightforward. Conflict has dragged the state to the top of the failed state list, and has caused the central government to implode. The lack of a legitimate central government has exponentially increased the effect of famine and a lack of resources. While the TFG is the internationally recognized government, it lacks performance legitimacy, and has not been able to consolidate power save for a small portion of Somalia. Without a true central government to protect resources, pirates will continue to ravage Somali fishing and trade ships, clans will continue to fight over control of resources, and food aid will continue to be exploited by TFG officials. The Somali rebel groups, such as al-Shabaab, have multiplied the effects of famine and have made the advancement of the state stagnant. This is because many states consider them a terrorist group, and will not help terrorists with aid. The nature of clan conflict in Somalia has actually protected it from the rise of another dictatorship, this is because Somalis will fight and die in the
name of their clans before they will see an oppressive ruler rise to power. The effects of conflict have not just been political; there are economic implications to the civil war as well. Somalia’s economy is largely agrarian and relies heavily on livestock. Livestock is the most important export for Somalia, and has not been immune to the various effects of the war (Awale et al. 2006). The climate of conflict in Somalia has a severely diminished veterinary aptitude; veterinary institutions are at capacity and do not have the ability to care for a sufficient amount of livestock, and resources, (e.g., drugs) that were once controlled by the veterinary department are now in the hands of a private sector unqualified to administer them, and they end up being sold for profit (Awale et al. 2006). Livestock veterinary care is only one facet of Somali resources affected by the civil war and state collapse, there are many others, such as; damage to irrigated agriculture, loss of credit institutions, damage to roads and other means of transportation, shortage of agricultural necessities (e.g., seeds), and lost investments of farmers due to farm destruction: All of these can be found within the context of Somalia’s main economic sector, agriculture. Conflict, paired with famine, can severely attenuate an economy that relies heavily on natural resources in the context of agriculture. With clans fighting over any and all resources they can get their hands on, the economy is bound to be affected. The Somali economy has looked surprisingly healthy, but it is not. Its GDP per capita in 1990 (before the war) was at $210, and the current GDP per capita—with an increased population by almost 2 million people (Central Intelligence Agency 2012)—in 2012 is $610. Somalia is a quintessential “war economy.” This is the case because, while there has been some economic growth, in time of war resources are sold and exported at such a quick rate due to the importance of short term gains (Grosse-Kettler 2004). With this emphasis on short term profits, due to conflict, resources and labor are exhausted quickly and the economy is difficult to be sustainable (Grosse-Kettler 2004). For the war economy to be sustained, Somalia must rely heavily on
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external resources, as the scarcity of resources in Somalia only fuels conflict. The regional context of the conflict as of today is not as straightforward as that on a national scale. The region of Africa, more specifically the Horn of Africa, has shown a consistent lack of stability in recent years. The Somali conflict does not just fall within the constraints of its own borders; all neighboring states are victims of spillover. Not only are the neighboring states involved and affected, but the conflict has also put a strain on the abilities and resources of the African Union. Currently, the African Union, Ethiopia, and Kenya have all put pressure on or sent troops to Somalia to fight rebel groups—such as al-Shabaab—with the support of pro-government Somalis (BBC 2012). The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has been active since 2007, and is a regionally based peacekeeping mission in Somalia. They were put into place by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1744, by operative clause four for a period of six months (United Nations Security Council 2007). AMISOM forces have recently started to gain enough power to take the burden of sending military missions off of neighboring states, such as Ethiopia (Yusuf 2012). In 2012, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2036, strengthening AMISOM, by increasing the maximum amount of troops, welcoming aid from AMISOM supporters, increasing logistical aid packages, and allowing AMISOM to use all necessary means to fight off al-Shabaab (United Nations Security Council 2012). Ethiopian forces have been able to recapture areas in Central and Southern Somalia that were controlled by al-Shabaab (Yusuf 2012). Along the lines of influence by neighboring states, the TFG fears Kenyan rule impinging on Somalia, in the form of a Jubaland—an autonomous area in Southern Somalia on the Kenyan border–buffer zone (International Crisis Group 2012).

Conflict in the region has led the TFG to work with neighboring states and powers to adopt a roadmap for peace and security. The first plan to make significant headway for peace in Somalia was the Djibouti Peace Process. The plan involved a peace accord with an 11-
point plan signed in 2008 between the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS)—an Islamic opposition group—seemed to be a big step toward the adoption of peace in Somalia (AMISOM n.d.). This plan involved enlarging Somali parliament and brought in members of ARS, allowing for more representation (AMISOM n.d.). A UN sponsored consultative meeting of state representatives—including many regional states—in the fall of 2011 adopted a roadmap to be implemented, within the framework of the Djibouti Peace Process and the Transitional Federal Charter, by August 2012 (United Nations 2011).

Another issue for the region, especially in areas of extreme violence, is the mass exodus of refugees into neighboring states—mostly Kenya and Ethiopia. Refugees are not as big of a problem when the state(s) receiving them are economically and politically stable enough to handle the influx. Many Somali refugees find their way to Dadaab, Kenya, and by September of 2011—after a summer that saw 140,000 (mostly) Somali refugees arrive—the refugee camp population hit 450,000, although it was only built to hold 90,000 (UNHCR 2012). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has projected planning figures for refugees—including Somalis—in the chart as follows.
The UNHCR representation in Kenya has projected increases of Somali refugees by 23% from during the period of January, 2012 to during the period from December, 2012 - January, 2013, and by 19% from during the period of December, 2012 - January, 2013 to during the period of December, 2013–all of whom will be assisted by the UNHCR. Ethiopia faced an influx of about 98,000 Somali refugees, while not as many as Kenya, conditions and resources are still an issue for Ethiopia (UNHCR 2011).

The international community has not had a consistent presence in the conflict of Somalia, on a state-by-state basis. The UN has not ignored the conflict, but actions taken, by way of resolutions, have not been successful in stopping the conflict. Attention has been paid to
Somalia when Somali actions have affected areas like international trade, mostly because of piracy. Piracy, in recent years, has been the main point of focus of international forces. In 2008 the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded 111 piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden, and from January 2009 to mid-September 2009, the United States Department of State had recorded 156 piracy attacks, 33 of them being successful hijackings (Blanchard et al. 2009). The UN Security Council has made efforts to train the TFG forces against piracy, but has been mostly unsuccessful due to a lack of central authority (Blanchard et al. 2009). Due to the juxtaposition of Somalia to the oil producing states in the Middle East—with the Gulf of Aden leading to the Red Sea—piracy in the area is of extra importance. In 2009, senior policy analyst of the Rand Corporation, Peter Chalk, estimated that piracy costs $1-1.6 billion a year for consumers (Blanchard et al. 2009). The USA, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, have legislated and implemented various plans to combat piracy and bolster the TFG with aid, materials, and training against piracy (Blanchard et al. 2009). The UN Security Council has also passed several resolutions on the issue of Somali piracy, including Resolution 1816 in 2008 which allows states to enter the territorial waters of Somalia to work with the TFG on suppressing acts of piracy using all necessary means (United Nations Security Council 2008). The importance of trade, paired with the instability in the region, caused the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) to create a joint task force—titled Combined Task Force 151—using ships from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey and, Yemen naval forces (Blanchard et al. 2009). NATO in 2008 and 2009 sent two missions, along with the EU in 2009, to the seas off the Horn of Africa to aid in the difficult issue of tackling pirate activity (Blanchard et al. 2009). More than just piracy has caught the eye of the international community. David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, hosted a conference in February of 2012, on the status of the
transitional government in Somalia. In this meeting, the end of the transitional period of governance in Somalia was reaffirmed to be August, 2012, and that to reach this deadline—with the support of the international community—Somali leaders must use the results of the London Conference (United Nations 2012). According to the BBC, “The conference agreed a seven-point plan promising more humanitarian aid, support for African Union peacekeepers and better international co-ordination” (BBC 2012). The international community has been spurred on—after years of disinterest—by what Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said here: “A new window of opportunity for peace and stability has opened. But it is a narrow window. All stakeholders must act with urgency and unity of purpose” (United Nations 2012).

While there have been internationally based military interventions in Somalia, through the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) missions, the approach to Somalia has been largely regionally based. The UNOSOM missions started in 1992 with UNOSOM I (United Nations n.d.) and then again in 1993 with UNOSOM II (United Nations n.d.). UNOSOM I was implemented to monitor a ceasefire in Mogadishu and end Mohamed Aidid’s new regime; UNOSOM I had limited military power, even with the support of United States and other forces by way of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) (United Nations n.d.). UNOSOM II was the rebuttal of the United Nations and international community to Somali factions not respecting the ceasefire called for in the UN Security Council (United Nations n.d.). UNOSOM II, while stronger militarily, were focused on rebuilding sustainable economic, political, and cultural reform to Somalia (United Nations n.d.). United States’ Quick Reaction Force—part of UNITAF—took a big, famous toll in October of 1993 losing 18 soldiers in Mogadishu (United Nations n.d.); dubbed the Battle of Mogadishu, the battle was then adopted into the Oscar winning film Black Hawk Down. This battle, among other reasons, caused the USA to withdraw their troops from Somalia in 1995 (United Nations n.d.), until early 2012 when Navy
SEAL Team 6 was sent in to rescue a captured American female and Danish man from Somali pirates (Mulrine 2012).

VI. Resolving the Conflict
The first step to resolving the specific conflict in Somalia is to reach a ceasefire; one that is respected by the several factions in the conflict. Sides are not ready to reach a resolution, whether through negotiation, mediation, etc., if there is still blood being shed on all sides. In this section, options to reach a ceasefire will be proposed, options for resolving the conflict once a ceasefire is reached will then be proposed, and one option will be recommended. A ceasefire can, once again, be called for by the UN Security Council, but the issue is not passing a resolution calling for a ceasefire, it is enforcing it and having all factions respect it. In light of the newfound support from the UN and international community of AMISOM, the first option for a ceasefire would be for more strengthening of AMISOM, to a point where it would have enough military power to enforce a ceasefire. Another option is, because of the inclination of neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Kenya, working with AMISOM, to send forces to Somalia, that the international community could incentivize these states to enforce a ceasefire. These incentives for neighboring states to enforce a ceasefire could range from financial to humanitarian aid. The third, and most ideal–but most difficult–option, would be to bolster the TFG’s power that would allow them to control more areas and stop violence.

Once a ceasefire is reached the conflict is not over, it is imperative that once violence is stopped a resolution must be reached and agreed on by all sides, as to create a sustainable climate for peace. Also, a ceasefire does not mean that the conflict is ripe for resolution. Assuming that it is, there are several ways to reach a solution. Options include negotiation, adjudication, and mediation, among others. For this specific conflict, options of negotiation and mediation will be used, due to the large number of parties to the conflict.

The first option of negotiating is to create a forum for representatives of the various factions of the conflict to communicate. For a
negotiation to be successful the image of the enemy that has lasted between the TFG since the fall of the Barre and Aidid regimes and opposition factions. Because of the difficulty with a conflict that has so many parties and the fact that conflict has gone on for over 20 years, the parties should have a single negotiated text (SNT) similar to that seen in the Camp David negotiations between Israel and Egypt (Raiffa 1982). The forum, which would be sanctioned by the UN, would need a place similar to Camp David to host it. An ideal location would be an advanced state, outside of Africa, that has not had specific interests in Somalia, ruling out the United States. An African state would not work as well to mediate this conflict because most states in Africa have had conflict, making them not ideal as a model for peace. Getting over conflict can instill hope in a nation like Somalia, but it can also make Somali representatives not willing to listen to a state. Also, this state should not be one that has an imperial presence in Africa. These stipulations are so that the parties to the conflict, while out of Somalia, will not have a preconceived notion that the state hosting does not have Somalia’s best interests at hand. The issue of who is to be represented is complex, as well. The TFG leaders will have to be present, as well as clan leaders, but groups such as al-Shabaab will have to drastically reform their group model and affiliations to have the support of not only the international community but also the other Somali groups. While radical groups in democracies have the right to be represented, due to the already volatile nature of governance in Somalia, radical groups should be required to change their views—as the split is due to ideological differences that can be changed, not ethnic differences—if they wish to have representation. With the issue of radical groups being represented at the forefront, non-radical Islamist groups should most definitely be represented, as Islam is a legitimate and well-practiced religion in much of Somalia. The difficulty of using a SNT is managing to draft it fairly and having all sides agree to it. It is well documented that the Somali people want peace, and by having negotiations in an advanced peaceful state (possibly democratic) it can be seen that agreeing to terms drafted by the best political minds.
the UN can give can make Somali representatives see that there is prosperity in peace. The UN must be involved in whatever state the negotiations end up being held in, because that way it is a plan adopted by the international community rather than a single state, lessening the influence over Somalia. With the SNT, these groups will have the ability to overcome the enemy image amidst crucial negotiations, and they will not come in with pre-sought out plans—which can drive negotiations towards stagnancy. The benefits of this option are that Somalis have become accustomed to international intervention, and have learned to fight it. This can lead to more conflict, or an increased lack of respect for decisions about Somalia made outside of Somalia. The point of peace negotiations in Somalia is to have all of the various groups represented as to not create an environment that would lead to continued uprisings.

The second option would be to have the autonomous region of Somaliland (BBC 2011) take the reins in mediating a resolution to conflict and a plan for continuing peace and stability. Somaliland is an autonomous region in Northern Somalia, which governs itself as a republic with political institutions, police, and its own currency (BBC 2011). Somalia is a state that has had a lot of international intervention, especially from Western powers, so an internationally led mediation might not be ideal. Somaliland is an Islamic Republic and has functioned with minimal conflict, with a somewhat successful private economic sector, although still relying heavily on foreign aid (BBC 2011). Somaliland is not as strong or stable as many advanced states, with increased foreign aid, a domestic solution, led by Somaliland, to the conflict would allow for the adoption of a fully Somali resolution and plan for peace. Leaders of Somaliland can take over from the TFG at the end of the transitional period in August, 2012, given that a comprehensive plan for Somali peace be obtained. With a domestic approach to conflict resolution, the sovereignty of Somalia will not be compromised, and with an agreed on plan for governance, more lives will not be lost at the hands of militias. Somalia, in the model of the current Somaliland republic, will need the support of the international community for economic aid, but
will be able to re-train former militia, under a unified rule, to protect and serve Somalia as a whole, not just their clan or group within Somalia. This plan, as aforementioned, is idealistic. It is idealistic because, while more stable than the rest of Somalia, Somaliland is not the perfect model of a functioning state. Also, Somaliland has the same problems as the rest of Somalia, including a lack of resources and susceptible to famine. But having a plan come from Somali leaders for the Somali people and having increased aid from states and NGOs, would allow Somalis their right of self-determination.

The last option for a non-violent peace agreement in Somalia is to bring the separate factions, post-ceasefire, together to negotiate autonomous regions. This can be used as a first action, but most likely as a backup plan, if settled negotiations/mediations do not work. Rather than bringing the parties together to rid them of enemy images, this plan would separate them, but allow for open communication; and an overarching central government, comprised of elected or appointed leaders of the various autonomous regions. For example, al-Shabaab wants to impose Sharia Law over all of Somalia, rather than fighting for the entire state, if they bolster enough support for strict Islamic culture, they can negotiate for an autonomous strictly Islamic region. Similar to a federal system, the regions could bring disputes between themselves, to a central body, but the central body will only be used for judicial purposes, as to allow regions to run themselves independently. The negotiations would have to be overseen by a state that has a federal system because of the importance of the groups agreeing on the negotiated borders, as to not harbor more conflict. The best option would be to have Indonesian negotiators: Indonesian because of Indonesia’s ability to create a stable, peaceful republic in a nation with many different ideologies, after an oppressive regime under President Suharto and being an area of interest for imperial colonialism (BBC 2012). Indonesia is also an Islamic state (BBC 2012), which would allow for a commonality between Indonesian mediators and Somali negotiators. This plan is not ideal, as it would separate the groups, which could lead to further de-humanization of the opposition.
Isolationism only works so long as everyone keeps to themselves, and does not venture out. In a state where resources are scarce, famine is prevalent, and people are largely nomadic, keeping them confined to borders is a tall order.

The best option would be the second option; having Somaliland, supported by the UN and international community, lead negotiations to create a fully Somali plan for peace. Because of the aversion of many less developed states to occupation by hegemonic powers, using an international plan to create peace in Somalia has and will continue to fail with every attempt. Somalia can then set precedence for states on the verge of failure, whether African or not, being labeled a “failed state” is not a life-sentence for a state. International influence still plays a large role in the plan, even though it comes from Somalis. Once peace is achieved, the conflict still is not over, international powers, including the UN, must still provide Somalia with aid, mostly economic, and help to preserve stability if the need should arise.

VII. Conclusion

Hope is not lost on Somalia. An external look at Somalia may show that there is seemingly no way to end the conflict, but upon an internal look that is proven false. Somalia is an unfortunate victim of colonialism and realism, essentially the victims of being used by more powerful states only when they are affected by Somalia. Because of this behavior by larger states, when the central consolidation of power under Barre collapsed, Somalia was left with no way of governing itself, so fighting for power ensued. The nature of clannism in Somalia especially exacerbated this violence, as clans fought tooth and nail against the weak TFG for control of the government. Disillusioned followers of Islam also adopted the radical ways of groups like al-Qaeda to form al-Shabaab, another group fighting the TFG for power. Without strong government institutions, piracy off the coast of Somalia has been able to run rampant and unchecked, save for when they affect international shipping. The African Union was given the authority, by way of AMISOM, as well as neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Kenya, to send troops to
Somalia to try to stop the fighting, to little avail. Somali refugees continue to pour into Ethiopia and Kenya, straining their already weakened ability to provide basic needs. The UN and other international powers have tried for years to end violence in Somalia through UNOSOM I, II, and UNITAF, but have not been successful. The deterioration of international intervention shows that problems do not always have to be solved from outside powers, they may need to provide support, but they do not need to take the lead on every issue. While agreeing with what Deputy Executive Director of Human Rights Watch Europe, Jan Egeland (Egeland n.d.), said, “I think the biggest challenge for Somalia has been the sense that it is a hopeless case of incomprehensible internal conflicts and there is nothing we can do,” (IRIN n.d.) hopefully this paper has disproved that belief and progress can be made in the leading failed-state of Somalia.

VIII. References


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