

Defining its future, engaging its public:

NATO's new Strategic Concept as a tool for survival

Robert Helbig

School of International Service
American University, Washington, D.C.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the cornerstone of the transatlantic partnership for the past sixty years. Even though the alliance lost its *raison d'être* after the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO remained important on both sides of the Atlantic.¹ The alliance expanded into Eastern Europe and launched major campaigns in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and, most recently, in Libya. Throughout the past decade, however, NATO faced internal disagreements over its responsibilities in the post-9/11 world. Most European states decreased their defense budgets markedly² and the Bush Administration has taken unilateral actions thereby undermining the transatlantic partnership.³ To develop a coherent strategy that both the U.S. and Europe can agree on, the NATO heads of states decided at the 2009 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit to draft a new Strategic Concept (SC) to renew the outdated SC from 1999. The new SC is supposed to occupy a place second only to the founding document, the Washington Treaty, and to serve as the groundwork for NATO's operations in the upcoming decade.⁴

This paper examines how NATO managed to endure after the Cold War, what issues NATO faces today, and how NATO uses its new SC to address those issues, thereby ensuring its existence in the future. In particular, the paper argues

¹ Jennifer Medcalf, *nato: a beginner's guide* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2005), 2.

² Stephen Fidler, "Cutting Defense Around Europe," *Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 2010, accessed September 29, 2010, <http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/06/25/cuttrting-defense-around-europe>.

³ Ivo Daalder, "The End of Atlanticsm," in *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*, ed. Tod Lindberg, (New York City, NY: Routledge, 2005), 39-60.

⁴ "NATO's New Strategic Concept – A Roadmap for the New Strategic Concept," *NATO*, accessed November 10, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/roadmap-strategic-concept.html#guiding>.

that NATO is trying to ensure its relevance in the future, which can best be explained by a combination of organizational and international institutionalist theory. What has been widely overlooked in the academic literature on NATO's institutional survival and the policy debate on NATO's new SC, however, is the relationship between NATO and the public of its member states. This is why this paper will not only address the new SC in terms of internal consensus-building, but also in regard to NATO's public diplomacy efforts.

Looking back: NATO's persistence after the Cold War

Originally, as NATO's first Secretary General Lord Ismay famously explained, NATO was designed to keep the "Germans down, the Russians out, and the Americans in".⁵ After Germany became a reliable partner for the West and the Soviet threat vanished, it became increasingly difficult for NATO to define its purpose. But the Alliance remained the keystone of the transatlantic partnership because it was able to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment by taking on new challenges, such as the stabilization of the Balkans and its enlargement into the former Soviet-controlled Central and Eastern Europe. Less than two years after the 9/11 attacks, NATO joined the U.S. fight against terrorism by taking over the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, thereby taking on the largest operation in the history of the Alliance.

Considering the changes in the security structure after the Cold War, it is worth looking at how NATO managed to remain relevant more than two decades after it lost its original purpose. Robert McCalla distinguishes between three different theories that provide an explanation of NATO's persistence. He explains that, from a neo-realist standpoint, alliances form because of an external threat.⁶ This is why one can assume that alliances break apart in the absence of an external threat. John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz, for example, argued that NATO would greatly cease in significance and eventually dissolve.⁷ Obviously, the neo-realist theory has serious shortcomings as it fails to look beyond the state-level and address NATO as an organization.

Here, organizational theory comes into play. Unlike neo-realism, organizational theory assumes that organizations are rational actors that have an interest in survival. This is why organizations act in three distinct ways to ensure their existence: they deny change, affirm their necessity, and adapt to change by taking on new missions.⁸ Organizations carry a lot of inertia because of their resistance to change and their institutional self-interest to survive. This is why

⁵Rajan Menon, "NATO, R.I.P.," *The American Interest* 4:2 (2008): 53.

⁶Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan. 1973. *Unity and disintegration in international alliances: Comparative studies*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 17.

⁷McCalla, Robert B. "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War." *International Organization* 50. 3 (1996), 445-475, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704032> (accessed February 22, 2011), 469-70.

⁸Ibid 457, 459.

bureaucratic leaders try to hold on to their critical tasks and continue to try gathering greater resources for the organization.⁹ If absolutely necessary for survival, organizations can adapt to new circumstances with the goal to protect its roles and resources.¹⁰ Richard Betts from Columbia University agrees when he argues that “[institutions] have a self-preservation instinct and successful ones especially want to keep validating their importance”.¹¹

Another theory that examines organizational persistence is the international institutionalist theory, which considers a complex system of multi-level and multi-issue relationships between member states and non-state actors.¹² This theory is based on the belief that institutions may remain beneficial to the member states even though they outlived their original purpose, which is why states tend to turn to existing organizations instead of seeking new ones.¹³ Maintaining or adjusting an existing organization is much cheaper for states than to create new ones.¹⁴ It is also advantageous to continue working through existing institutions because they provide a framework for consultation and coordination. NATO, which is not just a treaty, but also an organization, a “Treaty Organization”, according to its name, has staff, headquarters, and standard operational procedures. This makes the organization adaptable to new challenges and efficient in case of an emergency, which was most obvious in the case of 9/11 when it took NATO only two meetings of the Permanent Representatives and a few hours to invoke Article V for their first time in its history.¹⁵ The alliance has also been successful in the field. NATO has an allied command structure to its coordinate military operations, which helps the member states to achieve their goals very efficiently.¹⁶

Celeste Wallander refers to institutional “norms, rules, and procedures”¹⁷ as assets because they help to achieve “transparency, integration and negotiation”¹⁸ among the member states. She explains that the assets are specifically useful to address external security problems, but for an institution to endure, it is also essential to maintain internal stability and trust.¹⁹ This is why it is important to consider NATO not just as an alliance that is based on common threats, but also a product of common political and cultural roots which developed out of a common

⁹ Ibid 457.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Richard K. Betts, “The Three Faces of NATO,” *National Interest* 100 (2009): 31.

¹² Ibid, 461.

¹³ Ibid, 462.

¹⁴ Wallander, Celeste A. “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” *International Organization* 54. 4 (2000), 705-735, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601379>. (accessed February 22, 2011), 705.

¹⁵ Tuschhoff, 101.

¹⁶ Celeste A. Wallander, “NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out,” *Foreign Affairs* 81:6 (2002): 3.

¹⁷ Wallander, Celeste A. “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” 706.

¹⁸ Wallander, 712.

¹⁹ Ibid.

heritage.²⁰ A presumption of inherent ties between the two continents still affects the foreign policy of the U.S. and the European states. This is also evident in NATO's institutional setup. Unlike any pre-1939 alliances, NATO was not designed for short-time gains, but for "continuous and extensive self help and mutual aid", as stated in Article 3 of the Atlantic Treaty.²¹ Wallace Thies believes that NATO has "strong self-healing tendencies" because NATO members share their core values and regular turnover in the member states' government leads NATO to continuously "reexamine its old policies and develop new ones"²². He also argues that NATO, as an alliance of democracies, has "hidden strengths that would enable it to endure despite near-constant internal wrangling and recrimination".²³ For those reasons, both sides of the Atlantic may disagree on specific policies at certain times, but almost no one seriously questions the transatlantic partnership. NATO carries enough organizational momentum to sustain changes in the member states' security concerns. The member states coordinate in as many fields as possible because they share many of the same interests and face many of the same challenges in international security which has become increasingly interconnected. Thies' arguments are based on the advantages of international organizations comprised of democracies. But just like the neo-realist, organizational, and international institutionalist theory, his explanation fails to consider the need for domestic support for democratic organizations like NATO.²⁴ This is because the theories assume the organization and states to be rational with regard to their interests and overlook the power of domestic influences on foreign policy, especially the people themselves. This assumption neglects the factor of electoral approval for democratic governments to legitimately engage in international organizations.

NATO's internal problems today

Although NATO proved strong enough to survive and take on new tasks after the Cold War, it is still unclear where NATO will go in the future, mainly because of internal disagreements. Today, Harlan Ullman from the Atlantic Council argues, "NATO is at a profound crossroad"²⁵ again. The differences over the Iraq War and the increasing military capabilities gap between the U.S. and Europe have seriously harmed the transatlantic partnership during the last decade.²⁶ While the

²⁰ Wolfgang Ischinger, "Pax Americana and Pax Europea," in *Beyond Paradise and Power: Europe, America and the Future of a Troubled Partnership*, ed. Tod Lindberg, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 84.

²¹ Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures*, New York City: Cambridge University Press, 2009, 19; 288.

²² Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures*, 297.

²³ *Ibid*, 294.

²⁴ McCalla, 467.

²⁵ Harlan Ullman, "NATO's New Strategic Concept Must Make Alliance Relevant," *Atlantic Council*, July 8, 2010, accessed November 15, 2010, <http://www.acus.org/print/7625>.

²⁶ Ivo Daalder, "The End Of Atlanticism."

U.S. was seeking a coalition of the willing to fight in Iraq, many Europeans criticized the Americans for their unilateral actions.²⁷ At the same time, the U.S. has expressed its dissatisfaction over the decreasing commitment of a number of leading European states to common defense.²⁸ Kurt Volker, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, argues that “NATO has lost the underlying consensus that holds its members together. NATO is more divided over fundamentals today than at any time in its history.”²⁹ In particular, he refers to the impact of disagreements over NATO’s relationship with Russia, NATO’s core tasks, enlargement, and the meaning of collective defense.³⁰

The most pressing issue seems to be the military capability gap between the U.S. and the European NATO states. The U.S. spends roughly twice as much on defense as its European NATO allies combined.³¹ This is significant when considering that only about a third of the NATO states’ citizens are Americans and when taking into account that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the European NATO member states exceeds the American one.³² Even though the U.S. has always shared the main burden in NATO, the gap in defense spending grew even further when the European states significantly cut their defense spending after the Cold War, and, according to Robert Kagan, entered a “holiday from strategy.”³³ The Americans, on the other hand, kept their defense spending well above three percent of its GDP after the Cold War³⁴ and significantly increased its military expenditures after 9/11, even without considering the costs for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.³⁵ Europeans, in contrast, announced in 2009 that they were cutting government spending across the board, entering an

²⁷ Petar Kureci, "Bridging the Transatlantic Divide: The American-European Relations and their influence on European Unification," *Izvorni znanstveni rad* 73:4 (2008): 225.

²⁸ Kurt Volker, "A New Transatlantic Compact," (Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, 2010) accessed November 10, 2010, <http://www.acus.org/publication/new-transatlantic-compact>.

²⁹ Kurt Volker, "A New Transatlantic Compact."

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ SIPRI, (Military Expenditure Database) 2008, accessed September 24, 2010, <http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/download/?key=880afd981768f01325d40f764b545bb2&file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls>.

³² CIA, (World Fact Book) 2008, accessed September 24, 2010, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>.

³³ Kagan, 25.

³⁴ SIPRI, (Military Expenditure Database).

³⁵ Department of Defense, "United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request," February 2010, accessed November 23, 2010, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2011/FY2011_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf.

“age of austerity”³⁶ in which their defense sectors would be reformed. Although these reforms were supposed to make their militaries more efficient, they also cut the number of troops and decreased their defense expenditures, as anticipated in the British Defence and Security Review³⁷ and the German *Bundeswehrreform*.³⁸ Cutting defense budgets, however, is not a new phenomenon among European NATO states. In fact, only six out of twenty-eight NATO member states follow the NATO guidelines of spending at least two percent of their GDP on defense.³⁹

Although security cannot be measured in terms of defense spending, NATO must ensure that its capabilities are sufficient enough to act quickly and effectively in case of an emergency. Because the lack of European military capabilities has already affected NATO’s operations in the field, U.S. criticism about the reluctance of the European states to invest more in defense cannot be dismissed as a Cold War mentality. Much of the vital equipment needed for the ISAF operation, for example, is not even deployable outside of Europe – including strategic transport planes and helicopters.⁴⁰ Most recently, the European states were already running out of munitions, such as precision bombs, less than a month after NATO launched its operation in Libya.⁴¹ These examples show that the states must be prepared to fight if NATO is willing to take on large commitments; otherwise the Alliance will lose credibility as a serious actor in international security affairs.

³⁶ James Joyner, "NATO in the Age of Austerity," October 26, 2010, accessed November 23, 2010, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6839/nato-in-an-age-of-austerity>.

³⁷ “Securing Britain in an Age of uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,” *British Ministry of Defence*, October 2010, accessed November 18, 2010, http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf

³⁸ Raymond Pritchett, "European Militaries Shrinking, Becoming More Useful," September 2, 2010, accessed November 20, 2010, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/european-militaries-shrinking-becoming-more-useful.

³⁹ Martynas Zapolskis, "Redefining the Euro-Atlantic Security Agenda: What is the Role for the new NATO Strategic Concept," *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 23 (2010): 35.

⁴⁰ Esra Bulut, et al, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*. Paris: EUISS, 2009, Online Edition, 129; Daniel Korski. "Revisiting NATO-ESDAP relations – A checklist for enhances EU-NATO cooperation." 2008, accessed Mar 23, 2010 http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/Portals/7/Reports/2007/SDA_NATO_ESDP_relations_DiscussionPaper2008.pdf.

⁴¹ Karen DeYoung and Greg Jaffe, „NATO runs short on some munitions in Libya,“ April 15, 2011, accessed May 2, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nato-runs-short-on-some-munitions-in-libya/2011/04/15/AF307E1D_story.html.

The reluctance of European states to spend more on defense also led many scholars to question the value of NATO for U.S. foreign policy. The recommendations of the appointed Group of Experts, chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, argue that the lack of European defense spending has implications for NATO's military capabilities and political cohesion.⁴² Andrew Bacevich from Boston University even called for the U.S. to pull out of NATO because of the unwillingness of Europeans to invest more in their militaries.⁴³ NATO, however, remains important for the U.S. not just because the Americans can gain complementary capabilities of the "somewhat able" Europeans,⁴⁴ but also because of its political value for the Americans. The organization, as a body of liberal democracies, serves as a forum for multilateral engagement and as a source of legitimacy for U.S. led-operations.⁴⁵

Because of the growing internal differences, NATO has lost its role to be the main forum for discussion and consultation of its member states.⁴⁶ During the last decade, it became less certain that the member states on either side of the Atlantic continue to choose NATO as a body for discussion and consultation. The EU states increased their commitment to the European Security and Defence Policy⁴⁷ while the U.S. chose not to consult NATO in the beginning stages of the war in Afghanistan⁴⁸ and decided to invade Iraq without the support of major NATO states, such as Germany and France.⁴⁹ Kamp even described the process as "re-nationalization of security policy"⁵⁰ and called on NATO to "reactivate the transatlantic bargain."⁵¹

⁴² Recommendations for New Strategic Concept, "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement," *NATO*, May 17, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>, 38.

⁴³ Andrew J. Bacevic, "Let Europe be Europe," *Foreign Policy* March/April 2010, accessed November 10, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe.

⁴⁴ Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," 46.

⁴⁵ Paul Hockenos, "U.S. and Europe: Partnership of Equals," *World Policy Review* 25:4 (2008): 18.

⁴⁶ "NATO HQ – time for a makeover?," *NATO* video, 2010, accessed November 19, 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO_Change/HQ_Makeover/EN/index.htm.

⁴⁷ Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," 43.

⁴⁸ Christan Tuschhoff, "Why NATO is Still Relevant." *International Politics* 40 (2003): 103.

⁴⁹ Jacques Chirac, "Interview With Jacques Chirac," September 9, 2002, accessed April 13, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/09/international/europe/09CTEX.html?pagewanted=1>; Gerhard Schroeder, "Traces of Terror: Seeing America Through the Eyes of Berlin," *New York Times*, Sep 5, 2002a, A12.

⁵⁰ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "New NATO Strategy: Just What is it For?," 25.

⁵¹ "NATO HQ – time for a makeover?," *NATO* video.

Looking Ahead: Defining future tasks to overcome today's differences

It is clear that NATO presently faces major internal challenges. It is therefore, not a coincidence that the Alliance decided to update its groundwork for future cooperation. Many scholars argue that the transatlantic tensions can be overcome through a clear definition of NATO's purpose today and after its engagement in Afghanistan. In a publication by the Center for European Policy Analysis, Andrew Michta states that NATO faces an "identity crisis"⁵² and that the new SC should help the alliance to define its core tasks. Christopher Chivvis from the RAND Corporation also argues that the new SC "must [...] revitalize the alliance by defining a suitable set of purposes that it will serve in the future."⁵³ The former U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski believes that the new SC serves to "update meanings and obligations of collective security."⁵⁴ Naval Postgraduate School Professor David Yost explains how NATO faces the challenge of agreeing on a common purpose and balancing the required resources with the member states' commitments.⁵⁵ Research Director of NATO Defense College Karl-Heinz Kamp agrees when he states that the new SC needs to set "priorities so that demands may be brought in line with resources."⁵⁶ It is clear that a number of leading experts argued that the new SC will be a profound document that will determine NATO's future tasks while considering its limited resources.

By updating NATO's tasks, the new SC provides a doctrine for NATO's future operations, which includes a plan to achieve NATO's goals. If NATO's considers its goal to be "peace and security"⁵⁷ for the people of its member states, then it also needs to consider what constitutes peace and security, and what actions NATO should take to achieve peace and security. NATO cannot develop a strategy for every possible threat to the peace and security of its people, which is why NATO needs to define its tasks and prepare for specific threats. Otherwise, NATO will be an ad hoc alliance without the ability to act quickly and coordinate the member states' militaries most effectively. In this context, it is also important to consider NATO's commitment to collective defense, which rests on Article V of

⁵² Andrew A. Michta, "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Not an Either-or Proposition," *Center for European Policy Analysis*, April 1, 2010, accessed November 14, 2010, www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=231&printview=1.

⁵³ Christopher S. Chivvis, *Recasting NATO's Strategic Concept*, Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation, 2009, Online Edition, ix.

⁵⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "An agenda for NATO: toward a global security web," *Foreign Affairs* 88:5 (2009): 2.

⁵⁵ David S. Yost, "NATO's evolving purposes and the next Strategic Concept," *International Affairs* 86:2 (2010): 489-522.

⁵⁶ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Towards a New Strategy for NATO," *Survival* 51: 4 (2009): 22.

⁵⁷ NATO, "What is NATO." 2011. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-0431BB10-86C13C89/natolive/what_is_nato.htm

the 1949 Washington Treaty: an attack on one is to be considered an attack on all.⁵⁸ Collective defense can only be an effective deterrent against the attack on NATO's homeland if NATO can provide for effective crisis management. NATO needs to define what kind of attacks apply to Article V, and how NATO will respond to those attacks. Only if those basics are clearly set out in a doctrine and NATO states commit themselves to NATO's original mandate of collective defense will Article V remain an effective deterrent against newly emerging threats.⁵⁹ This is why the issue of core tasks received a lot of attention in the literature on NATO's new SC.

NATO's future tasks were also considered in the recommendations of the Group of Experts for the new SC. The recommendations address a number of diverse threats, such as terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, cyber attacks, climate change, energy shortage, the financial crisis, and ballistic missile attacks.⁶⁰ Although all of these threats could have devastating consequences for the member states' security, NATO is unlikely to be the right forum to counter every single one of these threats. In the case of climate change, for example, NATO may have to deal with the consequences, but the organization is unlikely to intervene in the environmental policies of its member states. For such reasons, scholars have focused on the question of which core tasks NATO should undertake in the future. Chivvis, for example, introduces five possible focus areas: a new focus on the greater Middle East, a focus on fragile states, a focus on non-state actors, a refocus on Europe, and a global alliance of liberal democracies.⁶¹ He argues that NATO should refocus on Europe and combine this task with one or more of the first three models.⁶² This could provide a framework for NATO to deter Russia in Eastern Europe as well as focusing on emerging threats like failed states. Chivvis believes, however, that it is unlikely that NATO will become a global alliance of democracy because this would decrease its political and military efficiency through further costs, the consideration of more geopolitical areas, and the limited value of new possible member states.⁶³ J.D. Gordon, the former Spokesman of the Department of Defense for the Western Hemisphere, simply argues that global membership "would water NATO down too much"⁶⁴ because policymakers would agree much less than they are already agreeing on today. Brzezinski agrees that "NATO cannot – as some have urged – simply expand itself into a global alliance to transform itself into a global alliance of democracies."⁶⁵ Thereby, he counters Daalder who supports the liberal argument that NATO

⁵⁸ "The North Atlantic Treaty," *NATO*, April 4, 1949, accessed November 14, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁵⁹ Stephen J. Cimbala. *Collective Insecurity: U.S. Defense Policy and the New World Order*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995, 144.

⁶⁰ "NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement," *NATO*.

⁶¹ Chivvis. *Recasting NATO's Strategic Concept*.

⁶² *Ibid*, 25.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 23.

⁶⁴ JD Gordon, interviewed by Robert Helbig, November 14, 2010, Washington, DC.

⁶⁵ Brzezinski, "An agenda for NATO: toward a global security web," 20.

should use its potential to become a global alliance of liberal democracies.⁶⁶ Other scholars also believe that the new SC should focus on specific roles, instead of assigning NATO too many global tasks. Jos Boonstra from the leading Spanish think tank FRIDE, for example, does not see the need for NATO to take responsibility in energy security and environmental issues.⁶⁷ Colonel Patrick Warren of Brookings even argues that a NATO that tries to “defend everywhere [is] ultimately defending nowhere.”⁶⁸ It is clear that the vast majority of experts do not expect the new SC to prepare NATO for global membership and believe that the alliance should limit its scope of tasks.

The arguments that NATO should work more effectively in a smaller field of security are in alignment with the calls for balancing the Alliance’s commitments with the member states’ resources. Former NATO Secretary General Jan de Hoop Scheffer was right in stating that “[t]he degree of solidarity that a nation wants to render today is very much at its own discretion.”⁶⁹ Considering the decrease of European defense spending⁷⁰ and the ongoing commitment in the Middle East, it is reasonable to argue that NATO needs to take into account its limited resources when defining its core tasks. It will, therefore, be a challenge to balance NATO’s future tasks with the decreasing resources allocated by the member states.

Next to the debate about balancing NATO’s tasks with its resources, the new SC also raises questions on a broad range of issues such as partnerships and membership, internal organization, and NATO’s relationship with Russia. U.S. Representative Michael Turner, for example, argues that NATO needs to reinforce its “open door policy” in order to engage NATO aspirants.⁷¹ Others would like NATO to focus on increasing the efficiency of the internal decision making process to be more flexible in crisis situations.⁷² And further scholars debate the question of whether the new SC should focus on building a more coherent strategic partnership with Russia⁷³ or whether Russia should be considered in the context of

⁶⁶ Ivo Daalder, “Democracies of the World, Unite,” *The American Interest* 2:3 (2007): 5-15.

⁶⁷ Jos Boonstra, “Old wine in a new bottle? NATO’s new Strategic Concept,” (Issue Brief, FRIDE, 2010) www.fride.org/download/PB48_NATO_ENG_jun10.pdf.

⁶⁸ Patrick T. Warren, “NATO’s Strategic Concept: To Defend Everywhere Is To Defend Nowhere,” *Brookings*, accessed September 29, 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0528_nato_strategy_warren.aspx.

⁶⁹ Jan de Hoop Scheffer, “NATO: securing our future,” *NATO*, accessed September 29, 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-09FA434E-FF4DC897/natolive/opinions_56150.htm.

⁷⁰ Stephen Fidler, “Cutting Defense Around Europe.”

⁷¹ Michael R. Turner, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A View from Capitol Hill,” *Center for European Policy Analysis*, March 1, 2010, accessed November 11, 2010, www.cepa.org/ced/view.aspx?record_id=220&printview=1.

⁷² Jean-Pierre Maulny, “Towards A New NATO Strategic Concept,” (Issue Brief, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010) <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07409.pdf>, 5.

⁷³ Brzezinski, “An agenda for NATO: toward a global security web,” 14.

NATO enlargement and missile defense.⁷⁴ It is clear that many experts point out different priorities for NATO to consider in its new SC.

Beyond tasks and capabilities: NATO's new Public Diplomacy

Unlike the strategic military and diplomatic aspect of the new SC, the public diplomacy aspect of the new SC has been widely overlooked by the existing literature as well as on NATO's institutional survival. Only considering the content of the new SC would be incomplete because NATO used the *process* of drafting the new SC to reach out, mainly to the public of NATO states. The organization chose to invest in public diplomacy because NATO has a public relations problem.⁷⁵ The problem goes back to the transatlantic divide over issues like Iraq that affected the public perception of NATO, as the bedrock of transatlantic security affairs. It is therefore hard for NATO to justify its operations in the light of transatlantic tensions and an increasingly complex security environment to the people.⁷⁶ NATO's Deputy Secretary for Public Diplomacy Babst points out that:

[...] the average reader of a national newspaper bases his perceptions more on Cold War stereotypes than political realities and knows little about NATO's performances in the field of current operations and missions, crisis management, partnership relations, or civil emergency planning. [...] Many NATO Allies have only recently realised that if they want to carry the Alliance's messages convincingly to global audiences, they cannot afford to limit their efforts to their national élites, ignoring the rest of the population. [...] In today's media world, organizations can no longer afford to preach and assume that the public is listening.⁷⁷

This is why NATO used the opportunity of drafting its new SC to explain what NATO is and what NATO does in the twenty-first century.

Using public diplomacy is traditionally a tool of state governments "intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries."⁷⁸ During the

⁷⁴ Kamp, "Towards a New Strategy for NATO," 25.

⁷⁵ "Public understanding - simplicity is genius (part 1)," *NATO* video, 2010, accessed November 13, 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO_Change/Public-Understanding-Simplicity1/EN/index.htm.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷ Stephanie Babst. "Reinventing NATO's Public Diplomacy," *NDC Research Papers* 41 (2008), 1-8, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=CAB359A3-9328-19CC-A1D2-8023E646B22C&lng=en&id=94347>. (accessed February 21, 2011), 3, 5.

⁷⁸ Charles Wolf Jr. and Brian Rosen. "Public Diplomacy: How to Think About and Improve It," 2004.

Cold War, the U.S. invested a lot of money in projects like Radio Free Europe to broadcast its message to the people behind the Iron Curtain. After 9/11, public diplomacy gained the attention of the policymakers again,⁷⁹ especially with several initiatives in the Middle East, such as Alhurra Television and Radio Sawa. But today, public diplomacy is more than government-controlled broadcasting. Non-state actors like NGOs and corporations have become increasingly involved in the public diplomacy process which has become more interactive than during the Cold War.⁸⁰ Think tanks, such as the German Marshall Fund and the Atlantic Council as well as many small and mid-sized foundations are working outside of the government to advance transatlantic relations, which proves to be a valuable addition to the national public diplomacy programs. And today, even the U.S. State Department's public diplomacy division increasingly engages in educational and cultural affairs with tools like Smartphone apps and social networks.⁸¹

Before looking at NATO's public diplomacy specifically, it is essential to distinguish public diplomacy from official diplomacy with the example of the United States. Public diplomacy focuses on the public through public means which is different from official diplomacy which describes government-to-government interaction, often carried out behind closed doors. The concept of influencing the public opinion of foreign countries is akin to the concept of soft power, which is known as the power to attract and persuade others.⁸² Effective U.S. public diplomacy, therefore, attracts people to the image of the U.S. and persuades the people to be in favor of U.S. policies. Public diplomacy is not the random spread of information, but it usually follows a plan to target specific audiences by using different communication strategies. This is why public diplomacy is also often linked to so-called "strategic communication."⁸³ Projects targeted towards younger people, for example, are more likely to focus on social networking sites or high school essay contests than on luncheon discussions to reach the target audience. No matter how the programs are designed, the general method remains the same:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf
(accessed Feb. 21, 2011). RAND

⁷⁹ Kenneth Matwicz. "Assessing U.S. Public Diplomacy," 2010.

<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/149966.pdf> (accessed Feb. 21, 2011), 10.

⁸⁰ Kathy R Fitzpatrick. *The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy*. 4, *Diplomatic Studies*. Jan Melissen. Boston, MA: Brill, 2010, 87-88.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of State, "Bureau of International Information Programs." Jan. 27, 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/iip/index.htm> (accessed Feb. 23, 2011).

⁸² Joseph S. Nye Jr. *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics*. 1 ed. New York City: Public Affairs, 2004.

⁸³ This term is commonly used in defense and counterinsurgency. For further information, see: Reding, Anais et al. *NATO's Strategic Communications concept and its relevance for France*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publications, 2010.; U.S. Department of Defense, "Principles of Strategic Communication." August 2008. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Principles%20of%20SC%20\(22%20Aug%2008\)%20Signed%20versn.pdf](http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/Principles%20of%20SC%20(22%20Aug%2008)%20Signed%20versn.pdf) (accessed Feb. 24, 2011).

engaging and informing foreign people, communicating values and policy, thereby influencing opinion, and enhancing national security.⁸⁴ Public diplomacy, just like other foreign policy tools, follows the general goal to serve the U.S. interests, but it is unique in that it reaches beyond foreign governments by focusing on the people of foreign countries to promote better understanding of U.S. culture, values and policies, as well as to create a specific image of the U.S. in the mind of the foreign public.

Although public diplomacy, as a foreign policy tool, is less controversial than, say, economic sanctions or war, its outcome is often less predictable. Public diplomacy programs are designed to influence a large pool of people which, in turn, are expected to influence a country's policy in favor of the U.S. in the long term. But different peoples respond differently to the image of the U.S. or may view specific messages untactful. While a lot of people are attracted to American brands, they may severely disagree with American values. It is therefore crucial for the effectiveness of public diplomacy not to use a one-size-fits-all strategy, but rather to focus on individualized initiatives. Otherwise, broadcasting a certain message can have the reverse effect and hurt U.S. foreign policy. Public diplomacy programs may also be too passive and overly broad, therefore not achieving any specific results. It is clear that public diplomacy needs to be used wisely to achieve the desired outcome. But once having developed an effective strategy, public diplomacy can go a long way.

NATO's leadership held the same view and created its Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) as a part of NATO's Brussels headquarters in 2003,⁸⁵ at a time when the transatlantic divide was especially large over the Iraq War. The PDD does not only handle traditional public relations, such as press, media and communication, but it engages in education and information projects to influence the people's image of NATO in the long term.⁸⁶ But it was not until the serious military drawbacks in Afghanistan in 2006 that NATO member states allocated enough resources for NATO's PDD to effectively reach out to the people of NATO countries with the goal to sustain public and legislative support for the ISAF operation.⁸⁷ Finally, in the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration, the NATO leaders stated that "[w]e will seek greater domestic support for our operations, including through improved public diplomacy efforts."⁸⁸ After Anders Fogh Rasmussen became NATO Secretary General in 2009, NATO actively started

⁸⁴ Fitzpatrick, Kathy R. *The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy*, 94.

⁸⁵ Babst, Stephanie. "Reinventing NATO's Public Diplomacy", 4.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ NATO, "Bucharest Summit Declaration." April 3, 2008.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed Feb. 21, 2011).

to implement its new public diplomacy which was most evident in the case of the new SC.⁸⁹

What is special about NATO's use of public diplomacy in context of the new SC is that NATO mainly focused on the public of its member states instead of the public of foreign countries, say Afghanistan or Russia. This is because NATO struggles with a number of internal issues as outlined by Volker above.⁹⁰ NATO, as an international organization, can use its resources to influence its own people, which is different from democratic governments that are generally prohibited from influencing public opinion by promoting their policies with their taxpayers' money. Political parties and candidates can raise money for their campaigns, but they cannot actively use taxpayer money to convey a more favorable image of themselves in the eyes of the electorate.⁹¹ In contrast, NATO invests money to display itself as a "transatlantic peace protector and security provider"⁹² to the people of its member states with the money collected from the member states' taxpayers. Providing money to NATO indicates that member states view it as a worthwhile investment to influence their own people to be more supportive of NATO. It also shows that national governments have enough trust in NATO to provide money to the organization, not just for promoting peace and security, but also to promote its own image to the people of the member states.

After all, for NATO, as an alliance of democracies, it makes sense to invest money and energy to gain support from its member states' electorate. Robert Keohane, Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik point out that even in highly developed international organizations, the member states make the final decisions.⁹³ Wallander argued that an institution has to act in the interest of its member states in order for it to persist.⁹⁴ Because all NATO states are democracies in which only the legislative branches of government have the power to authorize mandates to join NATO operations, NATO depends on the electorate of the parliaments. This means that NATO is directly dependent on the people of its member states; which is different from non-democratic alliances, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which more or less only depends on the will of the member states' leaders. Looking back the theoretical discussion of NATO's

⁸⁹ Jorge Benitez, interviewed by Robert Helbig, February 24, 2011, Washington, DC.

⁹⁰ Kurt Volker, "A New Transatlantic Compact."

⁹¹ Some exceptions exist, such as in Germany where political parties are granted specific amounts of money by the government, but the point is it is not legitimate for democratic governments to exploit their tax revenue to influence public opinion.

⁹² Babst. "Reinventing NATO's Public Diplomacy", 7.

⁹³ Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo, and Andrew Moravcsik. "Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism," *International Organization* 63. (2009), 1-31, <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/multilateralism.pdf>. (accessed February 22, 2011), 23.

⁹⁴ Wallander, Celeste A. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War." *International Organization* 54. 4 (2000), 705-735, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601379>. (accessed February 22, 2011), 705.

endurance, the explained theories fail to consider the domestic support for democratic organizations like NATO.⁹⁵ But public opinion has always influenced NATO. In 1966, for example, Charles de Gaulle decided to withdraw France from NATO's integrated military command structure out of domestic political concerns⁹⁶ and in 2010, the Dutch were the first NATO member to withdraw their troops out of Afghanistan over domestic opposition to the ISAF operation.⁹⁷

Madeline Albright acknowledged at a press conference that NATO is "an Alliance of democracies which is the basis of the Alliance itself, which obviously means that our publics need to understand what this is all about in the 21st century."⁹⁸ This is why it is crucial to use effective public diplomacy to help NATO revitalize its importance in the eyes of the electorate.⁹⁹ NATO is, therefore, not only engaged in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghans, but also of the Europeans and American. Without public support, NATO will be unable to continue its current engagement in Afghanistan and future engagements elsewhere because it will lack the funding and commitment from national parliaments that have control over the budgets and over the decision to join a NATO operation. As Jorge Benitez from the Atlantic Council points out, "the center of gravity of NATO is the political will of its people and NATO needs to do a better job strengthening it."¹⁰⁰ Having agreed that it makes sense for NATO to invest in public diplomacy, it is essential to look at how public diplomacy can be most effectively applied.

Kathy Fitzpatrick describes four main public relations theories that can also be applied to public diplomacy between international organizations and the people of their member states. The press agency model describes one way of communicating untruthful information – also referred to as propaganda.¹⁰¹ The public information model is also a one way model, but it is designed to influence people with truthful information.¹⁰² The two-way asymmetric model describes a way in which two parties interact, but one is framing the message, such as in

⁹⁵ McCalla, 467.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Jorge Benitez. "Dutch become 1st NATO member to quit Afghanistan." August 01, 2010 .<http://www.acus.org/natosource/dutch-become-1st-nato-member-quit-afghanistan> (accessed Feb. 23, 2011).

⁹⁸ Anders F. Rasmussen and Madeline Albright, "Joint Press Conference," May 17, 2010, accessed November 9, 2010. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_63696.htm.

⁹⁹ Zapolskis, "Redefining the Euro-Atlantic Security Agenda," 43.

¹⁰⁰ Jorge Benitez. "NATO's Center of Gravity: Political Will." May 21, 2010. http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/nato%E2%80%99s-center-gravity-political-will (accessed Feb. 21, 2011).

¹⁰¹ Fitzpatrick, 116.

¹⁰² Ibid.

political campaigns.¹⁰³ And the last model is the two-way symmetric model which is based on genuine communication and engagement between the parties.¹⁰⁴

Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault are narrowing down public diplomacy to three types. The first one is monologue by which governments convey a message to other countries' people, which is very similar to Fitzpatrick's one-way public information model.¹⁰⁵ When President Reagan, for example, stood in front of Berlin's Brandenburg Gate and called for Gorbachev to "tear down this wall," he sent a specific message to the German people and the people around the world that influenced their image of the United States. The second type is dialogue, which is described as the exchange of ideas and increase of understanding between different peoples, for example through student exchanges and the Fulbright program.¹⁰⁶ Both monologue and dialogue are important types of public diplomacy, but the best way to promote a longstanding partnership is through collaboration. Cowan and Arsenault believe that working on a joint project to achieve common goals is the best way to build a shared sense of ownership and to build social capital, because joint achievements provides the basis for lasting partnerships and a shared vision for the future.¹⁰⁷ The conclusion that increased interaction leads to a better relationship between the parties is in alignment with Fitzpatrick's argument that genuine interaction, if possible with shared goals and common achievements, leads to a better relationship between an organization and its constituents.¹⁰⁸ It remains important, however, to see if NATO uses collaboration to develop a better partnership to its member states' people.

In a 2009 speech, Deputy Secretary for Public Diplomacy Stephanie Babst laid out six principles of NATO's new public diplomacy:

1. Public Diplomacy is about listening.
2. Public Diplomacy must be connected to policy.
3. Public Diplomacy must be credible to be effective.
4. Public Diplomacy is not always about you.
5. Public Diplomacy needs to respond to the challenges of the Web 2.0 world.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 117.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault. "Moving from Monologues to Dialogue to Collaboration: The Three Layers of Public Diplomacy," in *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*, ed. Geoffrey Cowan and Nicholas J. Cull, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008), 10-30, 11

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 12, 19.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 23.

¹⁰⁸ Fitzpatrick, 117.

6. Public Diplomacy requires proper planning, training and resources.¹⁰⁹

She stressed the need to genuinely base NATO's public diplomacy on listening, which enabled NATO both to consider what the public thinks and to adjust its outreach to specific target audiences.¹¹⁰ Instead of trying to manage all public diplomacy by itself, Babst mentions that NATO needs to work with and through third parties, such as think tanks. She also stresses the need to train NATO personnel beyond public speaking skills and she states the need to use new online social networks, such as YouTube.¹¹¹ NATO's PDD has done its homework explaining the need for advancing the relations with the people of NATO states and developing a "public diplomacy that fits our time."¹¹² For its work, NATO's PDD was even awarded the 2010 "Danish Defence Minister's Communication Prize" for its new public diplomacy strategy.¹¹³ It is now important to look at NATO's new SC which can be considered the first large-scale case of NATO's new public diplomacy.

Applying NATO's new public diplomacy: The new Strategic Concept

NATO structured its way towards the new SC in three stages: the reflection phase which took place between the decision to launch a new SC in April 2009 and the publication of the recommendations by the Group of Experts in May 2010, the consultation phase which took place until the end of summer 2010, and the drafting and final negotiation phase which took place on the diplomatic level until the NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010.¹¹⁴

During the first two phases, NATO reached out to the public which Babst called the "period of inclusiveness."¹¹⁵ She has good reason to do that because it was NATO's strategy to reach out to the member states' people before the alliance started the internal drafting process. NATO organized a massive public diplomacy program in cooperation with the foreign ministries of the NATO states: four international seminars, more than 140 outreach activities (small seminars, workshops, and background briefings), public debates, digital discussions, student

¹⁰⁹ Stephanie Babst, "Public Diplomacy - The Art of Engaging and Influencing," Jan 22, 2009. http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Babst_Public_Diplomacy.pdf (accessed Feb. 21, 2011).

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 4-5.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 8, 7.

¹¹² Ibid, 3.

¹¹³ Media Newswire, "Communication Award for NATO." Oct. 10, 2010. http://media-newswire.com/release_1129512.html (accessed Feb. 22, 2011).

¹¹⁴ NATO, "NATO's New Strategic Concept – A Roadmap for the New Strategic Concept"

¹¹⁵ Stefanie Babst, "NATO's new Strategic Concept: Inspired by the masses?," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 9:1 (2010): 61.

discussions, and essay competitions for students.¹¹⁶ NATO also set up a website for the new SC, which included background information, 70 short videos, 48 web stories, a calendar of events, a bibliography of relevant articles, and a discussion forum which was visited by almost 10,000 people.¹¹⁷ Many of those events were organized in cooperation with public institutions such as think tanks and NGOs.¹¹⁸ Unfortunately, NATO's outreach took place at a time when the policymakers and the attentive public were mostly focusing on the ongoing economic and financial crisis and – especially in Europe – on Greece's debt crisis, which made NATO's new SC less of an important news story in the media.

It is clear that the goal of public diplomacy is to influence the opinion of as many electorates as possible. NATO's problem, however, is that not a large percentage of its member states' population is interested in security policy and, in particular, NATO's new SC. The majority of the people may have an opinion on the war in Afghanistan, but it is doubtful that many are invested in the debate about NATO's future tasks.

By looking at NATO's outreach, one can conclude that NATO was mainly targeting the elites, such as the policymakers, the media, and the attentive public, the people who are interested in NATO. It makes sense to keep the public diplomacy programs selective and focus on the elites because those people are more receptive to policy debates and they will shape NATO's overall image in the public. NATO could have reached the general public by advertising the new SC in the half time of sports games, but it chose to engage in informational and educational programs with the elites, who usually have a large influence on domestic public opinion. It was, therefore, more important for NATO to engage with, say, policy experts at think tanks who publish policy memos that are read by officials of the foreign ministries, and participate on panels that are watched by foreign policy advisors, who advise politicians that can display NATO in a positive light to influence the opinion of their constituents.

But NATO did not just inform and educate the elites on the new SC; the organization also encouraged the elites to provide input for the new SC. This is why so many think tanks drafted policy memos and so many experts attended the events and participated on the discussion forum on the website to voice their opinions. An illustrative example on how NATO included the public was the "Security Jam," which allowed over 3,000 security and defense experts to discuss the new SC for six consecutive days.¹¹⁹ Through actively collaborating with the experts to prepare the internal drafting process, NATO used the most engaging type of public diplomacy. According to Cowan's and Arsenault's explanation of collaboration as public diplomacy above, cooperation between NATO and the member states' public on a joint project (the new SC) to achieve a common goal

¹¹⁶ Babst, "NATO's new Strategic Concept: Inspired by the masses?," 62-63.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 64.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 62.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 64.

(peace and security) results in a stronger and longer lasting partnership between the actors.

No matter how inclusive the reflection and consultation phases of drafting the new SC were, however, it remains unclear how much impact the public's input had on the final content of the new SC. After all, NATO cut off all public consultation when the organization began the drafting and final negotiation phase. To be fair, it is crucial for states to conduct the final decision-making process through means of official diplomacy between high-level ministry officials to act in the interests of their elected governments, undistracted from the opinion of specific stakeholders. No one expected NATO's member states to invite thousands of experts to jointly work on a Google-document to draft the new SC, but NATO could have kept its public diplomacy effort going by publishing drafts of the new SC and explaining its progress. It would have provided a clearer picture on specific policy decisions and it would have increased the transparency of NATO's decision-making process. After encouraging the experts to give input on the new SC, NATO, or the member states, could have at least updated them on whether their opinion was considered or even adopted by NATO. This is not to say that NATO did not include the experts' advice in the new SC. In fact, many issues that were part of the outside debate were considered in the new SC, such as missile defense, cyber security and enlargement.¹²⁰ But NATO could have created an even closer relationship with the member states' public if it carried out the final negotiation and drafting process more transparently.

Even after NATO agreed on the new SC, a number of leaders stressed the importance of the new SC to draw the public's attention on the product of what defines NATO in the next decade. NATO General Secretary Rasmussen, for example, claimed that Lisbon was "one of the most important summits in the history of this alliance."¹²¹ Almost every major newspaper covered the Lisbon Summit substantially and the new SC was discussed by the policymakers and the attentive public after it was published.¹²² Even the average newspaper reader was exposed to the large coverage of the NATO summit. The long-term effect on public awareness, however, cannot be assessed yet, but it remains remarkable that NATO used an official document to engage the public for the first time in its institutional history. This is a major change compared to previous SCs. While the SCs of the Cold War were classified military documents,¹²³ NATO became more transparent after the fall of the Berlin Wall and made its 1991 SC open to the public, mainly as a sign to dissolving Soviet Union that NATO was not a threat to

¹²⁰ Jorge Benitez, interviewed by Robert Helbig, February 24, 2011, Washington, DC.

¹²¹ Anderson F. Rasmussen and Madeline Albright, "Closing press conference," November 20, 2010, accessed November 21, 2010.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_68887.htm.

¹²² Henning Riecke, interviewed by Robert Helbig, November 22, 2010, Berlin, Germany.

¹²³ "Strategic Concept," *NATO*, 2010, accessed November 8, 2010,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_56626.htm.

the Soviet block any longer.¹²⁴ Even the 1999 SC, which was written internally, without public outreach and consultation with security experts outside of NATO,¹²⁵ was not a step forward to become more inclusive to the public. This is why the new SC can be considered as a symbol of NATO's new strategy to open up to the people of their member states.

It is also remarkable that NATO was trying to keep the new SC very simple. NATO, an organization of twenty-eight member states that is operating in many parts of the world, managed to portray its strategy for the upcoming decade in only eleven pages. It remains crucial for NATO to be able to explain its missions to its 900 million member states' citizens and the people that are being affected by NATO around the world.¹²⁶ U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton believes that the member states' leaders need to explain to the public what is at stake and why NATO remains relevant.¹²⁷ In order for governments to be able to take the new SC to their people to argue for their involvement in NATO, the document had to be kept very simple.¹²⁸ Approval of the people is crucial for NATO states to commit money and lives to military operations.¹²⁹ This is why NATO was trying to provide a document to its member states that helps them legitimize their engagement with the organization¹³⁰ by explaining to them the "current validity of the Alliance."¹³¹ The idea that the new SC will serve the member states to legitimize their engagement, however, requires member states' governments to believe that it is a priority to reach out to the public and advocate for NATO. But it is unclear if the attentive public, let alone the policymakers, have read the document, let alone thought about its implications for the future of NATO. Former U.S. Ambassador

¹²⁴ Jorge Benitez, interviewed by Robert Helbig, February 24, 2011, Washington, DC.

¹²⁵ "General Klaus Naumann, Former Chair, NATO Military Committee." *NATO* video, 2010, accessed November 13, 2010. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO_Change/Klaus_Naumann/EN/index.html.

¹²⁶ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "New NATO Strategy: Just What is it For?," *The World Today* 65:10 (2009): 25.

¹²⁷ Hillary R Clinton, "Secretary Clinton's Speech at NATO Strategic Seminar," February 22, 2010, accessed November 12, 2010, <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/February/20100223115552eafas0.4237787.html>.

¹²⁸ "Public understanding - simplicity is genius (part 1)," *NATO*.

¹²⁹ Stefanie Babst, "Startschuss für die Diskussion über das neue Strategisch Konzept. Ein Bericht über die Konferenz "NATO's New Strategic Concept: Launching the Process"," *Zeitschrift für Außen- Sicherheitspolitik* 4:2 (2009): 502.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, 504.

¹³¹ Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "NATO at 60: Time for a new Strategic Concept," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7:4 (2009): 12.

to NATO Robert Hunter, for example, believed that “after the [Lisbon] summit is over, nobody is going to read it.”¹³²

Conclusion: How the new Strategic Concept helps NATO to address its problems

The new SC helped NATO both to address its differences by developing a consensus, and by addressing its public relations problem. As pointed out above, the discussion on the new SC was centered on what kind of organization will be in the future. Through the high-level consultation, NATO states made compromises on a number of issues. The new SC can, therefore, be seen as the lowest common denominator of the NATO states’ beliefs on what NATO should be. An eleven-page document cannot clarify any policy issues in detail, but it proves that NATO states still share the same overall values and interests. It gave the states the chance to consolidate their trust in Euro-Atlantic alliance of like-minded democracy that share a common heritage and whose security cannot be separated from another. This is why the new SC is foremost of political value and symbolizes NATO’s unity today, and can be considered “an invocation of political will or – to put it another way – a renewal of vows, on the part of each member.”¹³³ Having formed a consensus on what NATO should look like in the future, however, does not help NATO gain domestic support. This is why it is just as important to consider the new SC in context of NATO’s new public diplomacy. NATO focused on the elites of the member states to engage in both educational as well as interactive programs to build social capital and improve NATO’s image in the long term.

Consensus on how NATO should look like in the future as well as public support can help NATO to become the primary place for consultation, just like it was during the Cold War. As McCalla argues, NATO’s survival depends on how much the members benefit from the Alliance.¹³⁴ By restoring its image of being the most capable organization to address the security concerns of all member states, NATO can regain the member states’ commitment to NATO¹³⁵ and clarify the meaning of Article V, NATO’s collective defense clause. The new SC can also be seen as an attempt by NATO, and its largest contributor, the U.S., to convince the European governments of the necessity to allocate more resources and, by gaining public support for NATO, to empower the governments to spend more money on defense. Former NATO Assistant General Secretary Marshall Billingslea believes

¹³² Atlantic Council, "The Lisbon Summit and NATO: Revitalization or Retrenchment: 09/29/10 – Transcript," September 29, 2010, accessed November 3, 2010, <http://www.acus.org/event/lisbon-summit-and-nato-revitalization-or-retrenchment/transcript>.

¹³³ Recommendations for New Strategic Concept, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” *NATO*, May 17, 2010, <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf>, 6.

¹³⁴ McCalla, 461.

¹³⁵ Oana Topala, "ISIS Europe Briefing Note: NATO’s raison d’être in today’s strategic environment," *European Security Review* 51 (2010): 6.

that “relocating money from the Europeans may not be part of the new SC, but of the debate.”¹³⁶ Only when the member states regain confidence in NATO, the alliance – and the U.S. – can ask for more contributions.

If the new SC is effective, it will convince the member states’ governments to invest more in defense and security. Ideally, the governments can use the new SC to shape the domestic debate and explain why it is crucial to spend money and risk lives in operations that may be abstract to the public’s understanding of security. This, in turn, would allow the member states to allocate more resources at home for NATO operations abroad because defense spending is highly influenced by public opinion.¹³⁷ Ian Brzezinski from the Atlantic Council, for example argues that Obama should use the new SC to lay out a roadmap of strategic prioritization in order for the Europeans to understand how much is necessary to spend.¹³⁸ Daalder argues that the Europeans need to understand that every country gains a lot of security when each one invests only a few more resources.¹³⁹

Taking NATO’s post-Cold War history as well as its internal problems and the new SC into consideration, one can conclude that NATO used the new SC as a tool for survival. One crucial element of NATO’s new SC is that NATO defined its overall future tasks, thereby adapting to the security environment, and remaining relevant for the member states. This is in alignment with the organizational theory, after which an organization acts in the interest of survival, if necessary by taking on new challenges. But NATO’s new public diplomacy efforts indicate that NATO is also trying to gain support from the public, thereby reinforcing its importance at the level of the electorate. The case of the new SC, therefore, also supports the international institutionalist theory, which is much more state centered and assumes that states tend to work through existing organizations. By ensuring domestic support for NATO, the states would not have an incentive to create new organizations or transform other ones, such as the European Union. This is why both the organizational and the international institutionalist theory help explain how NATO used the new SC as a tool for further survival.

¹³⁶ “The one issue the Strategic Concept must deal with is...,” *NATO* video, 2010, accessed November 14, 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO_Change/Strategic_concept_issue/EN/index.htm.

¹³⁷ Zapolskis, 43.

¹³⁸ Ian J. Brzezinski, "Obama's Five Challenges at Lisbon," November 15, 2010, accessed November 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/opinion/16iht-edBrzezinski.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=nato&st=nyt.

¹³⁹ “What does it mean for the military?,” *NATO* video, 2010, accessed November 15, 2010, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2009/NATO_Change/MeaningForMilitary/EN/index.htm (accessed November 15, 2010).

The discussion showed that NATO has taken the right steps to reestablish itself in the eyes of the member states and their public. The Alliance has proven to be dynamic enough to redefine itself over and over again, which is why NATO is the main security institution for the U.S. and Europe today and will be in the next decades to come. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked that NATO evolves with the times and thereby remains “relevant and indeed irreplaceable”¹⁴⁰ because the Alliance is able updated its missions and hold up a strategic consensus among its member states. But Gates also stated that “NATO is not now, nor should it ever be, a talk-shop or a Renaissance weekend on steroids.”¹⁴¹ This is why NATO needs to move forward now to put its ideas into concrete policies and ensure that those policies result in peace and security for its member states. Only then, can NATO remain the most successful political and military alliance in the history of mankind.

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